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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs' Claims
1.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's granting of

summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs' second amended complaint,
where dismissal was based on Plaintiffs' sworn testimony from the
temporary injunction hearing that they had not tendered performance
under

the

real

estate

purchase

contract,

but

instead

began

negotiating a lease option that was never accepted by nor signed by
Defendants?
"A trial
summary

court's

judgment

is

decision
a

legal

to grant
one

and

or deny
will

be

a motion

for

reviewed

for

correctness." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913
P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995).
2.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's denial of

specific performance of the real estate purchase contract, which
Plaintiffs abandoned in favor of negotiating a lease option, where
Plaintiffs,

in

their

complaint,

asked

for

enforcement

of

the

contract only under a theory of fraud, which theory they do not
brief on appeal, instead claiming on appeal a breach by Defendants
and an excused tender by Plaintiffs?

1

A

trial

court's

decision

on

whether

to

require

specific

performance is an equitable one, reviewed for abuse of discretion,
Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
while "[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for
summary

judgment

is

a

legal

one

and

will

be

reviewed

for

correctness." Silver Fork Pipeline Corp./ 913 P.2d at 733.
3.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's rejection of

Plaintiffs'

promissory

estoppel

claim

where

Plaintiffs,

after

failing to obtain financing to close the REPC, prepared a written
proposed lease option which they submitted to Defendants and which
Defendants did not accept, sign or return to Plaintiffs and where
Defendants did not indicate that they would not require a written,
signed agreement that complied with the statute of frauds?
"Promissory estoppel is an equitable claim . . . ." Andreason
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
As a trial court's determination thereon is an equitable one, it is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, Carr, 781 P. 2d at 1294, while
"[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
judgment is a legal one and will be reviewed for correctness."
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d at 733.
4.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's denial of

Plaintiffs' motion to amend to add a breach of contract claim,
where that claim was not raised in Plaintiffs' amended complaints
but

rather belatedly

raised

by motion

2

after

the entry

of the

summary judgment, and where, in any case, Plaintiffs

failed to

perform their obligations under the real estate purchase contract?
"[This Court] overturn[s] a trial court's denial of a motion
to amend a complaint only when . . . [the Court] find[s] an abuse
of discretion." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 739
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). Meanwhile, "[i]f a contract is unambiguous,
interpretation

of

the

contract

is

a

question

of

law,

review[ed]. . . under a correctness standard." Craig Food Indus.,
Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
5.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's rejection of

Plaintiffs' motion to amend its complaint to add a claim for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, where that claim
was not raised in Plaintiffs' amended complaints but raised only
after the entry of the summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs'
complaint and where the alleged wrongful actions of

Defendants

occurred only after the REPC had been set aside and the date for
closing had passed?
"[This Court] overturn[s] a trial court's denial of a motion
to amend a complaint only when . . . [the Court] find[s] an abuse
of discretion." Kelly, 87 P.3d at 739.
6.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's decision not

to permit Plaintiffs to amend their complaint pursuant to Rule
15(b), where Plaintiffs' complaint had already been dismissed by

3

summary judgment and where Plaintiffs had already filed two amended
complaints?
"[This Court] overturn[s] a trial court's denial of a motion
to amend a complaint only when . . . [the Court] find[s] an abuse
of discretion." Kellv, 87 P.3d at 739.
7.

Should this Court reject Plaintiffs' entreaty to find

Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5 unconstitutional on due process grounds
where the due process argument was limited, before the trial court,
to the right to appeal and other due process issues are raised for
the first time on appeal, where the statute affords parties

an

opportunity to be heard before any ruling on a motion brought
pursuant thereto and where the losing party may apply for a stay
pending appeal?
"Constitutional

issues

. . . are questions of law .

review[ed] for correctness.'7 Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1185
(Utah 2004).
8.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's ruling denying

Plaintiffs'

request

for

reimbursement

of

attorney

fees

where

Plaintiffs did not prevail at the trial court?
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law,
. . . review[ed] for correctness." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40
P.3d 1119, 1125 (Utah 2002).

4

Defendants' Cross-Appeal
9.

Did

the

trial

court

err

when

it

determined

that

Plaintiffs' lis pendens was not a wrongful lien on Defendants'
property, where Plaintiffs sought to enforce a lease option that
was not accepted nor signed by Defendants, where Plaintiffs sought
to enforce

a real

estate

purchase

contract

that,

following

a

temporary injunction hearing, the trial court found unenforceable
due to Plaintiffs' failure to tender their performance and where
Defendants notified Plaintiffs to remove the lien based on the
ruling of the trial court following the injunction hearing?
"[I]ssues of law . . . [are] reviewfed] for correctness."
State v. Gonzales, 127 P.3d 1252, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
10.

Did the trial court err by not awarding Defendants their

attorney fees where the contract provided that the prevailing party
should recoup attorney fees incurred in an action to enforce the
contract

and where

Defendants

were

required

to defend

against

Plaintiffs' efforts to enforce the contract?
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law,
. . . review[ed] for correctness." R.T. Nielson Co., 40 P.3d at
1125.
11.

Should Defendants recover the attorney fees incurred on

appeal where the contract provides for the prevailing party to
recover fees?

5

"Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law,
. . . review [ed] for correctness.'' R.T. Nielson Co. , 40 P. 3d at
1125.
CITATION TO THE RECORD AS TO ISSUE PRESERVATION
Defendants raised the issues of wrongful lien and/or attorney
fees in their answer and counterclaim, R. 64-73, their Motion to
Award Fees and Costs with its companion memorandum, R. 522-36,
their subsequent reply memorandum, R. 568-81, and their memorandum
in opposition to Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. R. 421-66.
The trial court awarded fees for the injunction hearing, based on
statute, but denied the request for fees based on the REPC. R. 729.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code § 25-5-3
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. See Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. See Appellants' Addendum 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5. See Appellants' Addendum 2.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). See Appellants' Addendum 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, as buyers, and Defendants, as sellers, executed a
real estate purchase contract

(REPC) in August of 2004 with a

closing date of October 24, 2004. In September 2004, Plaintiffs
6

informed

Defendants

that

they

could

not

obtain

financing.

The

parties, at the suggestion of Plaintiffs, then started to negotiate
the terms of a lease with option to purchase (the Proposed Lease) .
The parties did not come to an agreement

on the terms of the

Proposed Lease and, in late October, Defendants received another
offer for the property and sold the property to a third party.
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint for specific performance. After
Plaintiffs testified that they had not performed under the REPC,
the complaint was amended to seek enforcement of the Proposed Lease
under the theories of fraud, waiver and promissory estoppel, and
enforcement of the REPC under a fraud theory, which Plaintiffs did
not brief on appeal.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition
The case has a lengthy procedural history due primarily to the
numerous amendments and motions filed by Plaintiffs in an effort to
find a claim on which they might prevail. The proceedings are as
follows:
1.

The original complaint was filed in November 2004. R. 5.

2.

A hearing on Plaintiffs' request for an injunction was

held on November 29, 2004. At that hearing, Plaintiffs admitted
that they encountered difficulty obtaining financing to purchase
the property, that they then began negotiating a lease option and
that

they

never

tendered

the purchase

7

price.

See Addendum

B,

excerpts from temporary injunction hearing. The trial court denied
Plaintiffs' request for an injunction. R. 47.
3.

On January 20, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended

Complaint changing their theories and requesting enforcement of the
Proposed Lease under the theories of fraud, waiver and promissory
estoppel, and enforcement of the REPC under a fraud theory. R. 57.
4.

Defendants

filed

an

answer

and

counterclaimed

for

reimbursement of legal fees and costs, as well as damages under the
wrongful lien statute and the terms of the REPC. R. 64.
5.

On August 26, 2005, Defendants filed their motion for

summary judgment. R. 117.
6.

On

November

1,

2005,

Plaintiffs'

filed

a

responsive

memorandum and cross-motion for summary judgment. R. 191.
7.
for

the

Plaintiffs also filed a motion to amend their complaint
second

time, pleading

the

same

causes

of

action

but

attempting to plead fraud with more particularity. R. 368.
8.

Oral argument on the motions was held on December 19,

2005. R. 498.
9.

On January 11, 2006, the court issued its Ruling and

Order, granting Defendants' summary judgment motion, dismissing
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint and denying Plaintiffs' crossmotion for summary judgment. R. 508, Addendum C.
10.

Defendants then filed their Motion to Award Costs and

Fees seeking the relief requested in their counterclaim. R. 534.
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11.

On

January

30,

2006,

Plaintiffs

filed

a

motion

to

reconsider and attempted therein to assert new claims. R. 553.
12.
the

On March 14, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion to conform

complaint

to

the

evidence

with

a proposed

Third

Amended

Complaint which asserted new claims. R. 643.
13.
Order

On March 29, 2006, the trial court issued its Ruling and

denying

Plaintiffs'

motions

to

reconsider

and

granting

Defendants' motion for fees only as it related to the injunction
hearing. R. 661, Addendum D.
14.

On April

10, 2006,

Plaintiffs

filed

their Notice

of

Appeal. Defendants responded with a Notice of Cross-Appeal, filed
on April 25, 2006. Defendants also filed a motion to release the
lis pendens on that same day. R. 702.
15.

On April 26, 2006, the trial court

dismissing

Plaintiffs'

Second

Amended

signed

its order

Complaint,

denying

Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, dismissing Defendants' wrongful
lien claim,

and

awarding

Defendants

the

fees

incurred

at

the

injunction hearing. R. 729, Addendum E.
16.

On May 10, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Stay

of the Execution of the Court's Orders and for Approval of the
Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond. R. 748.
17.
denying

On May

15, 2006, the trial court

Plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Conform

the

issued

its Ruling,

Complaint

to

the

Evidence. The trial court followed this ruling with two rulings on

9

June 21, 2006, one staying execution of its orders contingent upon
a

bond

being

Plaintiffs'

given

by

opposition

Plaintiffs,

to

the

fees

and

the

awarded

other

for

rejecting

the

temporary

injunction hearing. R. 779, Addendum F.
18.

On August 16, 2006, the trial court issued a Ruling and

Order granting the release of the lis pendens, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-40-2.5. R. 838, Addendum G.
19.

Plaintiffs, on August 23, 2006, moved for a stay of this

order and submitted a proposed bond with the trial court and with
this Court. This Court issued its order stating that the issue must
first be decided by the trial court and citing authority

that

Plaintiffs might need to bring a separate appeal on Defendants'
motion, as it could be deemed an enforcement action. R. 846.
20.
ruling

On November 21, 2006, the trial court issued its last

denying

Plaintiffs' motion

to

amend

their

appeal,

and

granting their motion to stay execution of the court's order based
upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5. R. 876, Addendum H.
Statement of the Facts
This statement of the facts, as that found in Defendants'
summary

judgment

memorandum,

is based

primarily

on

the

sworn

testimony of Plaintiffs at the injunction hearing on November

29,

2004,

the

excerpts

of which

are

attached

as Addendum

B,

and

transcript of which is listed at page 880 in the record. After that

10

date, Plaintiffs' facts changed and expanded in an effort to defeat
summary judgment.
While "searching the internet," Plaintiff Ty Eldridge (Ty)
learned of Defendants' intent to sell 280 acres in Duchesne County,
Utah.

R.

880:18:16-23. Sometime

in August,

2004,

Ty

contacted

Defendant James Farnsworth (James) about the property. R. 880:19:25. On August 24, 2004, James executed the REPC. J. Farnsworth Dep.
at 30:1-4, R. 121-79 (Exhibit B therein). Three days later, Ty and
his wife, Marina Eldridge

(Marina), signed the REPC. See REPC,

Addendum I.
The REPC designated the purchase price as $339,000. REPC f
2.1. The REPC further provided that October 24, 2004 would be the
settlement

deadline, REPC 1

24(d),

and that

"[t]h[e]

Contract

[could] not be changed except by written agreement of the parties."
REPC 5 14. Plaintiffs

submitted

a check for the earnest money

deposit to Basin Land Title, the closing agent, R. 880:22:20-24,
and applied for financing from Washington Mutual. R. 880:23:22-23.
Washington Mutual informed Plaintiffs that the bank "wouldn't
loan on a working farm." R. 880:24:21-24. Hence, Plaintiffs, on
September 9, 2004, prior to the time seller disclosures were due,
REPC f 24, contacted James to tell him of the difficulties with
Washington Mutual. Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' 1st Disc. Req. at 3, R.
121-79 (Exhibit D therein).

11

Plaintiffs

then

contacted

other

lenders. Those

lenders,

however, "wanted [Plaintiffs] to put up a big proposal on how . .
[they

would]

make

money

farming."

R.

880:25:12-15.

And,

Plaintiffs "don't have any experience farming." R. 880:44:20-21.
" [Ty then] started mentioning to [James] different financing
options. And the lease option was one of them." R. 880:25:19-20. Ty
acknowledged that, at first, James exhibited little amenability to
the lease option, describing James's level of "interest" as "not
much." R. 880:25:21-25. James, however, did later agree to discuss
proposed terms of a lease option, R. 880:26:7-9, and a written
"lease option[f dated October 5, 2004,] that [Ty] prepared . . .
[was] sen[t] to Jim to look over." R. 880:26:14-15, 21. From that
point on, the REPC was no longer pursued by the parties. R.
880:47:20.
Ty admitted that when Plaintiffs referred to closing, they
were "really talking about . . . having [the Farnsworths] accept
th[e] lease agreement." R. 880:47:25-48:4. Indeed,

Plaintiffs

conceded that after "commenc[ing] negotiating the lease option
agreement,

.

.

.

[they]

abandoned

their

efforts

to

secure

conventional financing," Second Am. Compl. 1 13, R. 467-473, and,
at the TRO hearing, Ty was asked, "as of October fifth, you had
replaced your real estate purchase contract with Exhibit Two, the
lease[?]" R. 880:47:17-18. He responded: "Yes. That's what I
thought was happening." R. 880:47:20.

12

After receiving the Proposed Lease, which Plaintiffs prepared
and sent to him, James "suggest [ed] . . . amendments to the[]
terms" of it. R. 880:27:14-18. The proposed lease, which remained
the subject

of negotiations

until November

1, 2004, was never

signed by the Farnsworths nor was it returned to Plaintiffs. R.
880:47:1-5.
Ty

testified,

Defendants
November

did

1,

not

2004.

at

the

accept
R.

temporary

injunction

the

for

offer

880:48:10-12. Ty

the

hearing,

lease

further

that

option

conceded

by

that,

"[o]ther than the earnest money, [he] never tendered any money" for
the REPC. R.
Sometime

880:49:1-13.
in the

last

few days

of October,

following

the

expiration of the REPC on October 24, 2004, James learned from
Gerald Wilkerson, a real estate agent, that a Shane Gardner was
interested in the property and then, a few days later that two
other

potential

buyers

wished

to

acquire

the

property.

J.

Farnsworth Dep. at 86:11-87:11, R. 121-79. On or about November 8,
2004, Defendants informed Plaintiffs of one of the offers and gave
Plaintiffs

the opportunity to match

it. J.

Farnsworth

Dep. at

92:15-25; 94:8-14, R. 121-79. Plaintiffs did not match the offer
and the property was sold to Byron Gibson, on November 12, 2004. J.
Farnsworth Dep. 104:18-19, R. 121-79. Plaintiffs then sued.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Plaintiffs, under

oath, testified

that

they

did

not

perform under the REPC, that the terms of the lease option were
never agreed to and that the lease option was never signed by
Defendants. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on those undisputed facts.
2.

The trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs' request for

specific performance, where Plaintiffs admitted that they abandoned
the REPC, that they did not tender the performance required by the
REPC, that the lease option terms were not agreed upon and that the
agreement was never signed by Defendants.
3.

The

statute

of

frauds barred

Plaintiffs'

attempt

to

enforce a proposed lease agreement that Defendants never accepted
nor signed. Defendants did not unequivocally indicate that they
would not

invoke

the

statute of

frauds as a defense.

Indeed,

Plaintiffs prepared a written offer for a proposed lease option.
The parties clearly anticipated a written agreement.
4.

As to Plaintiffs' fourth, fifth and sixth points, the

trial court properly exercised its discretion when it refused to
allow Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 15, to amend their complaint a
third time to include breach of contract, breach of good faith and
fair dealing and other claims after the court had already dismissed
the second amended complaint.
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5.
procedure

Utah

Code

to

obtain

unconstitutionally

Ann.
the

§

78-40-2.5,

release

violative

of

which

a

lis

sets

forth

pendens,

of due process, as

is

it affords

the
not
an

opportunity to be heard and does not bar the granting of a stay
pending appeal.
6.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their attorney

fees, as they were not the prevailing party and because they do not
address on appeal their claim of fraud, which was listed in their
complaint as the sole basis for enforcement of the REPC

(which

contains the attorney fees provision).
Defendants' Cross-Appeal
1.
placed

The trial court erred when it ruled that the lis pendens
on

Defendants' property

was

not

a wrongful

lien

where

Plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. Plaintiffs sought enforcement of
the Proposed Lease, which was not enforceable under the statute of
frauds. Further, following the temporary injunction hearing, where
it became clear Plaintiffs did not tender their performance under
the

REPC

and

had

abandoned

the

REPC,

Plaintiffs

nevertheless

refused to release the lien, despite notice from Defendants of the
lien's wrongful nature.
2.

Defendants are entitled to reimbursement of their legal

fees, based on the language of the REPC, incurred both at the trial
court

and

on

appeal

for having

efforts to enforce the REPC.
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to defend

against

Plaintiffs'

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED ON THE PLAINTIFFS' OWN TESTIMONY. PLAINTIFFS'
EFFORTS TO CHALLENGE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT BY AMENDING THEIR
COMPLAINT AND ENLARGING AND CHANGING THEIR TESTIMONY
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED BY THE COURT.
The material

and

essential

facts

were

testified

to by

Plaintiffs at the injunction hearing on November 29, 2004. At that
hearing, they admitted their difficulty in obtaining financing to
close the purchase, R. 880:24:21-24,25:12-15,25:19-20, and their
subsequent abandonment of the REPC when they opted to attempt to
negotiate a lease with option to purchase. R. 467-473; 880:47:20.
After a month and a half, the terms of a lease option were never
agreed to, R. 880:48:10-12, and Defendants sold the property to a
third party. Based on those undisputed facts, summary judgment was
appropriate in this case.
Rule 56(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
" [a] party against whom a claim . . . is asserted may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment
in his favor as to all or any part thereof." "The primary purpose
of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations of
the pleadings, show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, although an issue may be raised by the pleadings, and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 269 (1960).
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In this case, Plaintiffs

sought

enforcement

of the REPC.

However, in testimony at the TRO hearing and in their complaint, as
outlined above, they conceded that they had difficulty obtaining
financing,

that

they

never

tendered

payment,

and

that

they

abandoned the REPC. Plaintiffs then filed their First and Second
Amended Complaints calling for enforcement of the Proposed Lease
under

theories

of

promissory

estoppel,

fraud

and

waiver,

and

enforcement of the REPC under their fraud theory. R. 57, 467.
Defendants, after completion of discovery, filed their summary
judgment motion, based primarily on Ty' s testimony at the temporary
injunction hearing. Plaintiffs responded with a barrage of facts
requesting

summary judgment on their Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs' facts were either attempts to refute the Plaintiffs'
prior sworn testimony or were not material to the issues and were
disputed by Defendants. For example, Defendants did not accept any
offer for the lease option. The parties did not agree on a down
payment, a purchase price, an interest rate, or a monthly payment,
among other things. J. Farnsworth Dep. 46:5-16, 48:19-22, R. 421-66
(Exhibit A therein). James "talk[ed] to [Ty] about contacting an
escrow company to handle payment under the lease option, if it was
entered

into.'7

J.

Farnsworth

Dep.

at

55:23-56:1,

R.

421-66.

Moreover, James did not express approval of Ty's working on the
property.

In

fact, he asked

property "after

Ty

[he] found out

to

cease

from working

on the

[Ty] did it the first time." J.
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Farnsworth Dep. at 57:14-58:2, R. 421-66. Additionally, Defendants
did

not

lie

about

a

realtor.

James,

with

whom

Plaintiffs

negotiated, was not aware of David Farnsworth's communication with
the realtor about the problem until after October 30, 2004, J.
Farnsworth Dep. at 84:18-22, R. 421-66, and Plaintiffs concede that
they verified the listing on October 29, 2004, "confirm[ing] Jim's
story and ma [king] them feel at ease." Pis.' Facts 1 53, R. 419-20.
The trial

court

correctly

concluded

that, notwithstanding

Plaintiffs' Gatling gun approach, they had not advanced material
undisputed facts to avert summary judgment and that the material
undisputed facts required dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint.
In short, even when all Plaintiffs' facts were considered, they did
not

avert

summary

judgment

on

Plaintiffs'

fraud,

waiver

and

promissory estoppel claims.
Plaintiffs

then

attempted

to assert

new

claims

via post-

summary- judgment motions, but the trial court properly rebuffed
these efforts. Despite Plaintiffs' numerous motions and amendments
attempting to cloud the facts and issues, this case, at its heart,
is a simple case. Plaintiffs did not perform their obligations
under the REPC and abandoned it. The parties then negotiated the
terms of a Proposed Lease, but did not reach any agreement, and
Defendants did not sign the Proposed Lease, and, as a consequence,
it was not enforceable under the statute of frauds.
II. PLAINTIFFS NEVER TENDERED PERFORMANCE UNDER THE REPC
AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE THEREOF. THE
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PROPOSED LEASE WAS NEVER AGREED TO AND WAS NOT SIGNED BY
DEFENDANTS AND, THUS, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE LEASE
OPTION IS LIKEWISE NOT AVAILABLE.
Even though Plaintiffs failed to execute their duties under
the REPC, they asked the trial court to grant specific performance
of the REPC under a fraud theory

(which they did not brief on

appeal), or the Proposed Lease under theories of fraud, promissory
estoppel and waiver. The trial court properly denied the requests.
''Neither party to an agreement

y

can

be said to be in default

(and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for
specific performance) until the other party has tendered his own
performance/" Kellev v. Leudacia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243
(Utah 1992) (quoting Century 21 All W. Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v.
Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56

(Utah 1982)). Hence, in order to recover

damages or to force specific performance, a party must tender. In
the instant case, Plaintiffs did not tender their performance. The
REPC

settlement

deadline

was

October

24,

2004.

Addendum

I.

Appellants [sic] Brief, at 29, claims there were two other closing
dates —

October 28, 2004 and November 1, 2004. id. at 29, 34.

These dates are not listed in the Second Amended Complaint, which
states that "[t]he time set forth in the Contract to close, October
24, 2004, ha[d] passed,'7 R. 467-473, 1 5. Plaintiffs further assert
that they tendered their performance via a letter dated November 9,
2004. Appellants [sic] Br. at 29. There was no closing date other
than October 24th set forth in the REPC (Addendum I), and there was
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no

closing

date

for

the

proposed

lease.

R.

880:47:25-48:4.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Plaintiffs' new, and inconsistent,
closing

dates

were

valid,

Plaintiffs

did

not,

by

their

own

statement of the facts, "tender" until after the date set for
closing under either scenario, as November 9th falls after both
dates.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' November 9th letter did not constitute
a

tender. Plaintiffs

invoke

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1

for the

proposition that the letter expressing a willingness and ability to
close the contract was sufficient to meet the tender requirement.
Appellants

[sic] Br. at 29. However, as this Court explained in

Shields v. Harris, while
Section 78-27-1 . . . provides that "an offer in writing
to pay a particular sum of money . . . is, if not
accepted, equivalent to the actual production and tender
of the money[,]" Utah courts have interpreted this
provision to mean a valid tender requires an "obligor to
make a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the
amount of money due coupled with an actual production of
the money or its equivalent." "It is not enough to simply
inform the seller that the buyer is ready and willing to
perform the contract as planned."
934 P.2d 653, 655 (1997) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see
also Carr, 781 P.2d at 1295 ("Without the formal act of tender, .
. . [the Court is] left having to speculate about how [defendants]
might have responded. Avoidance of such guesswork is one of the
primary benefits of actually tendering one's performance and is a
sound reason for rather strict adherence by the courts to the
tender requirement.").
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Not only did Defendants neglect to tender the purchase price,
Plaintiffs also did not obtain loan approval prior to the REPC's
expiration. This is significant, because, as in Carr, "the subjectto-financing clause [of the REPC] was a condition precedent which
[Plaintiffs] w[ere] obligated to satisfy . . . .

Since

failed to do so, . . . [Defendants] w[ere] excused from
obligations

under

the

contract."

781

P.2d

at

1293.

[t]he[y]
[their]
Hence,

Defendants, like the defendants in Carr, ' M w[ere] excused
performing

[their]

[P]laintiff[s]'

duties

under

the

conduct, especially

contract

by

from

reason

of

[P]laintiff[s] ' failure

to

secure financing . . . . '" Ld. at 1295. Even assuming that none of
the parties tendered, "[w]here the contract states[, as in the case
at hand, ] that time is of the essence, cases hold that both parties
are discharged from their contract obligations if neither makes
tender by the agreed closing date." Webb, 645 P.2d at 55 n.l.
Plaintiffs failed to tender their obligations, including a
condition precedent, and their failure was not excused. Indeed,
tender is excused only when it would be truly fruitless, such as
"where the lienor states that he or she does not intend to accept
payment, where the lienor claims a larger sum that he or she is
entitled

to

collect,

and

where

the

lienor

has

coupled

the

legitimate claim with another claim." Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr.,
Inc. , 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (UtahCt. App. 1994) (citations omitted).
None of these facts is present in the instant case. There is simply
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no evidence that Defendants would not have accepted timely payment
of the purchase price, and Defendants did not require a sum greater
than the purchase

price, but, rather, afforded

Plaintiffs

the

opportunity to match a higher offer for the parcel only after the
REPC expired. J. Farnsworth Dep. at 92:15-25; 94:8-14, R. 121-79.
Defendants,

therefore, are not

"susceptible

to a judgment

for

damages or a decree for specific performance." Kellev, 846 P.2d at
1243.
III. DEFENDANTS NEVER AGREED TO WAIVE THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THEREFORE PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE USED TO CREATE A LEASE OPTION THAT WAS
NEVER AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES.
Utah law is clear. To be binding, agreements for the purchase
or lease of real estate must be written and executed by the seller.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party by whom the lease or sale is to be made . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3. What is more, "[i]t is settled law that a
modification of a contract must be in writing if the contract that
is modified must be in writing under the Statute of Frauds." SCM
Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986).
In SCM, the court confirmed these precepts, when it confronted
a situation that resembles the one at hand.
case, "executed a .

The plaintiff, in that

lease agreement," icl. at 106, but then

argued that the defendant "orally promised . . . that [he could
expand into . . . [additional] space" not covered by the written
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terms of the parties' contract. Xd. In rendering its decision, the
court "assume[d] for purposes of discussion that [the defendant]
and

[the

plaintiff]

made

an

oral

agreement."

Icl.

at

107.

Nevertheless, the court held that "[the plaintiff's] failure to
obtain whatever promise or agreement it had with [the defendant] in
writing made th[e] agreement unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds." Id.
In explanation, the court stated that "any modification of
[the lease]

. . . must be in writing." Jd. at 108. The court

further indicated that if the oral agreement were considered on its
own, rather than as a modification, that it would likewise fail,
because "[a]n agreement to enter into a future real estate lease
for a period longer than a year is within the Statute of Frauds,
and must be in writing to be enforceable." Jd. at 107.
In the present case, although there was no oral agreement for
a lease, even assuming that an oral lease option existed, such an
agreement

would

not bind

the parties. Whether

evaluated

as a

separate contract or as a modification of the REPC, the Proposed
Lease was not in writing and was not executed by Defendants.
Reliance on promissory estoppel does not alter this result. As
this Court explained in Stanql v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356,
360-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), where real property is "involv[ed],"
Utah cases have narrowly circumscribed the application of
promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds. A defendant
is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a
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defense only when he or she has expressly
unambiguously waived the right to do so.

and

In other words, "[p]romissory estoppel bars . . . asserti[on]
[of] the statute

. . . only where

the party

has clearly and

unequivocally represented that it would not use it as a defense."
Id. at 365-66. Thus, "a mere promise to execute a written contract
and a subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an
estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage
is sustained as a consequence of the refusal," McKinnon v. Corp.,
Etc., Latter-day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974), even if
"[t]he parties [have] agreed on lease terms and . . . ^promised to
have the

lease

agreement

drawn up.'" Stanql,

948 P. 2d at 361

(quoting Easton v. Wvcoff, 295 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1956)).
Identifying the policy underpinning enforcement of the statute
of frauds in real estate cases, the Court explained:
If this court were to reject prior Utah case law . . .,
parties to a contract negotiation could not rely on the
protections afforded by the statute of frauds, thereby
"eviscerating" it. Moreover, contract negotiators would
never know at what point mere negotiations became a
binding contract. Parties to contract negotiations should
be entitled to rely on the statute of frauds absent a
clear manifestation of intent to claim no reliance. A
party concerned about the assertion of the statute of
frauds could easily protect itself by demanding written
commitments
before
acting
in
reliance
on
the
negotiations.

In the
fact[s]

instant

case, Plaintiffs

. . ., but none

involves
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enumerate

conduct

on

"a plethora
the part

of

of the

defendant[s] that is tantamount to a representation that

[they]

would not avail [themselves] of the Statute of Frauds.'' McKinnon,
529 P. 2d at 437. Hence, Plaintiffs' facts," even if true, do not
warrant promissory estoppel. Neither party contests that the REPC
clearly stated that any amendment thereto had to be in writing, f
6, and all the parties anticipated that the proposed lease had to
be in writing. That is, after all, why Plaintiffs sent the written
lease to Defendants for their signatures. R. 880:26:14-15, 21. In
this case, promissory estoppel cannot defeat the statute of frauds,
because there is simply no evidence that Defendants "clearly and
unequivocally represented that [they] would not use [the statue of
frauds] as a defense." Stanql, 948 P.2d at 365-366.
IV. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT BY DEFENDANTS AND THE
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES WAS NOT TIMELY. THEREFORE, THE COURT
PROPERLY DENIED THE REQUEST FOR DAMAGES.
Plaintiffs made no breach of contract claim in their amended
complaints. Rather, they sought to add the claim by seeking to file
a Third Amended Complaint after the entry of summary judgment.
Defendants' objected to Plaintiffs' raising of the claim after the
trial

court

had

already

granted

summary

judgment

against

Plaintiffs, and the trial court rightly denied the request to amend
for a third time.
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiffs were allowed to initiate a
new claim after entry of summary judgment, they are not entitled to
damages, because, as previously
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noted,

" [n]either

party

to an

agreement ^can be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a
judgment for damages or a decree for specific performance) until
the other party has tendered his own performance.'" Kellev, 846
P.2d at 1243 (quoting Webb, 645 P.2d at 56) (emphasis added).
In

the

instant

case,

Plaintiffs

did

not

tender

their

performance. They did not obtain financing (a condition precedent
to the enforceability of the REPC) , and they did not otherwise
perform under the contract. Indeed, they set aside the REPC when
they started negotiating a lease option.
V. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT TIMELY RAISE THEIR CLAIM FOR BREACH
OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND THERE
CAN BE NO BREACH WHERE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PERFORM UNDER
THE CONTRACT AND DEFENDANTS ONLY EXERCISED THEIR LEGAL
AND CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS.
In a fashion similar to their breach of contract claim,
Plaintiffs first propounded a claim for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing after the trial court granted summary
judgment on the claims in their complaint. Plaintiffs raised the
claim in a motion for reconsideration. Such a motion is not
recognized by the Court, Radakovich v. Cornabv, 2006 UT App 454, f
5, and this claim should not be entertained by the Court.
"[E]ven if the issue were properly before this court, there is
no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a
party is simply exercising its contractual rights." Heiner v. S.J.
Groves & Sons Co,, 790 P.2d

107, 115

(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Defendants did act in good faith. They had no obligation to agree
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to and sign the Proposed Lease unless the terms were satisfactory.
When Plaintiffs allege Defendants would not close, by Plaintiffs'
own sworn testimony, that means Defendants would not agree to the
terms of the Proposed Lease. R. 880:47:21-48:4. Additionally,
Defendants did not lie about a realtor problem. James, with whom
Plaintiffs negotiated, was not aware of David's communication with
the realtor about the problem until after October 30, 2004, J.
Farnsworth Dep. at 84:18-22, R. 421-66, and Plaintiffs concede that
they verified the listing on October 29, 2004, "confirm[ing] Jim's
story and ma [king] them feel at ease." Pis.' Facts f 53, R. 419-20.
Hence, their accusations of dishonesty are somewhat perplexing.
After October 24, 2004, the REPC expired by its own terms.
Thus, any attempt to delay a closing thereafter was unnecessary.
And,

Plaintiffs

were

awaiting

Defendants'

acceptance

of

the

proposed lease by November 1st, the expiration date of Plaintiffs'
offer for a lease option. R. 880:48:10-12/ 46:17-20; 47:21-48:4.
There simply was no contract to close after October 24, 2004, and
there was no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
REJECTING PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS,
FOR A THIRD TIME, UNDER RULE 15, WHEN THE COURT HAD
ALREADY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THEREBY DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT.
Plaintiffs, citing Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

(Rule 15(b)), asked the trial court to conform their

complaint to the evidence, apparently meaning the list of facts in

27

their motion for summary judgment, as well as to conform their
complaint to allow claims raised after summary judgment. Rule 15(b)
provides that "when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
the express
treated . . .

or

implied

consent

of the parties, they

shall be

as if they had been raised in the pleadings."

Whether Rule 15(b) may be invoked when there has not been a
trial is a matter of disagreement. Blinn v. Beatrice Cmtv. Hosp. &
Health Ctr. , 270 Neb. 809, 816 (2006). No Utah authority seems to
directly address this issue, although one decades-old case, without
analysis, appears to apply Rule 15(b) to circumstances in which the
court granted summary judgment. Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111
(1963). Clearly, however, the plain language of the rule requires
a matter to be "tried" and makes reference to "the trial," Utah R.
Civ. P. 15(b), leading one court to opine, "Rule 15(b) allows a
court to revise pleadings to conform to the case as it actually was
litigated at trial. The present case did not go to trial; it was
decided on motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the situation
which Rule 15(b) addresses simply did not arise in the present
case."" Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, even if Rule 15(b) may be appropriately applied in
the instant case, the trial court nevertheless properly denied
Plaintiffs' motion to amend, because Defendants did not consent to
consideration of issues outside the complaint and would have been
prejudiced by consideration of them. Rule 15(b) is clear that its
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use is limited to situations in which ''issues . . . are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties.''
"Express consent may be found when a party has stipulated
to an issue or the issue is set forth in the pretrial
order.
Implied consent may arise in two situations. First, the
claim may be introduced outside of the complaint - in
another pleading or document - and then treated by the
opposing party as if pleaded. Second, consent may be
implied if during the trial the party acquiesces or fails
to object to the introduction of evidence that relates
only to that issue.
Implied consent may not be found if the opposing party
did not recognize that new matters were at issue during
the trial. The pleader must demonstrate that the opposing
party understood that the evidence in question was
introduced to prove new issues. . . .
[Hence,] A court may not find consent when evidence
supporting an issue allegedly tried by implied consent is
also relevant to other issues actually pleaded and
tried."
Blinn, 270 Neb. at 817 (quoting 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's
Federal Practice

§ 15.18[1], at 15-75 to 15-77

(3d ed. 2005))

(emphasis removed). In short, "[t]o satisfy rule 15(b), evidence to
which

no

objection

is

raised

must

be

directed

solely

at

the

unpleaded issue, in order to provide a clear indication that the
opposing party would or should have recognized that a new issue was
being injected into the case." Blinn, 270 Neb. at 819.
"Once a party objects to evidence at trial on the ground that
it is outside the issues raised in the pleadings, . . . the second
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rule 15(b) provision . . . applies." Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman
Fin., 974 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1999). In these circumstances,
[t]he trial court's discretion to grant amendment of the
pleadings is conditioned on the satisfaction of two
preliminary requirements: a finding that the presentation
of the merits will be subserved by amendment and a
finding that admission of such evidence would not
prejudice the adverse party in maintaining his action or
defense on the merits.
Id. at 291 (quoting England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 345 (Utah
1997)).
In Fibro, "Brahman [, not unlike Plaintiffs,] argue[d] that the
parties raised . . . [an] issue by implied consent because Fibro
argued [about it] in its trial brief." 974 P.2d at 292. The court
observed, "[h]owever,

[that] Fibro also objected to the court's

consideration of . . . [the issue] in that same trial brief," id.,
"during trial," id., and "post-trial." Id. As an "example

[of a

ground for denying amendment], . . . [the court stated that] Fibro
m[ight] be able to establish that amendment would prejudice it
because it had conducted discovery prior to . . . [the] raising [of
the issue] and therefore had not focused discovery efforts on the
. . . issue." Ld. n.1.
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs

attempted

to add

several

claims to their complaint, following the trial court's ruling on
summary judgment and after the court permitted them to twice amend
their complaint prior to summary judgment. These claims included
breach

of

the

covenant

of

good
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faith

and

fair

dealing,

misrepresentation, specific performance and breach of contract.
Defendants

did

not

either

expressly

or

impliedly

consent

to

consideration of these issues. Indeed, as outlined in Defendants'
Memorandum

in Opposition

to

Plaintiffs' Motion

to Conform

the

Complaint to the Evidence, Defendants strenuously objected to their
tardy introduction. R. 649-60.
Indeed,

whenever

it

was

apparent

that

Plaintiffs

were

attempting to introduce new claims (including those not briefed on
appeal),

Defendants

consistently

objected.

After

all,

"[R]ule

[15(b)] does not exist simply to ^allow parties to change theories
mid-stream.'" Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 831
(6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1198 (6th
Cir. 1988) ) .
Plaintiffs opted, for whatever reason, not to make certain
claims they later wished to utilize. Defendants would clearly have
been prejudiced by a decision to allow amendment, having prepared
a case with defenses and discovery based upon the claims supplied
in the First and Second Amended Complaints, and having successfully
obtained summary judgment thereon.
While rule 15 "permits the amendment of pleadings by the
court, . . . the rule is to be applied with less
liberality when the amendments are proposed during or
after trial, rather than before trial. In any event, the
granting of leave to amend is a matter which lies within
the broad discretion of the [trial] court.''
Brown v. Jorqensen,

136 P. 3d 1252, 1259

(Utah Ct. App.

2006)

(citations omitted). In the instant case, as in Brown, it could
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fairly

be

said

that

"[t]he

trial

court

denied

the

[Plaintiffs'] motion and concluded that . . . [Plaintiffs] had
ample opportunity to amend their pleadings much earlier and that
*it would be fundamentally unfair to allow . . . [Plaintiffs] to .
. . seek recovery of a different sort," ijd. (quoting the trial
court),

after

the

trial

court

granted

summary

judgment,

particularly where the only new claim analyzed in Plaintiffs'
summary judgment memorandum (aside from the three claims in the
complaint) was a call for specific performance, which the trial
court denied in its order on summary judgment.
In other words, Plaintiffs not only asked for amendment based
on arguments that were not in the first three complaints, but also,
in large part, asked for amendment based on claims introduced in
filings, such as their motion for reconsideration, that followed
the trial court's ruling on summary judgment. Even under a very
generous reading, Rule 15(b) does not, by its plain language, allow
a court to amend a complaint to allow claims raised after the
completion of trial to be deemed pleaded. Though the amendment may
take place after trial, the initial raising of the claims may not.
The trial court properly denied the motion.
VII. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-40-2.5 GOVERNS THE RELEASE OF LIS
PENDENS, AND THE SAME IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5 sets forth the procedure to obtain
a release of a notice of lis pendens even when a case is pending.
The statute provides that "a party to the action, can ask the court
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to release a lis pendens at "any time after a notice has been
recorded/' Utah Code § 78-40-2.5(2) (emphasis added). The statute
then states that "[a] court shall order a notice released if . . .
(a) the court receives a motion to release
court

finds

that

the

claimant

has

not

. . ; and

(b) the

established

by

a

preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real
property claim . . . ." Utah Code § 78-40-2.5(3).
Plaintiffs filed a notice of lis pendens when they filed this
action. The trial court then granted summary judgment and dismissed
all Plaintiffs' claims. Because

Defendants

filed

the

requisite

motion and Plaintiffs did not establish the viability of their
claim, the trial court granted Defendants' motion. R. 838-42.
Plaintiffs,

for

the

first

time

on

appeal,

challenge

the

constitutionality of that statute on a basis other than that it
infringes upon due process rights in terms of its interference with
the right to appeal. R. 741-46. This issue may also be moot since
the trial court issued a stay on November 21, 2006. R. 876. If the
Court decides to address this issue, then, as an initial point,
Plaintiffs "bear a heavy burden," State Ex Rel. Z.C., 128 P.3d 561,
564 (Utah Ct. App. 2005), because courts of this state "are guided
by the
statute,

rule that

"while

[they]

will

ruling

on the constitutionality

resolve

doubts

in

favor

of a
of

constitutionality.'" Id. (quoting State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995
(Utah 1995)). Indeed, "[i]t is . . . one of the important functions
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of the Legislature to change and modify the law . . . ," Berry v.
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985), and "due process
[does not] constitutionalize [ ] the common law or otherwise
freeze[] the law." Id.
Plaintiffs were not denied due process under the statute. They
had an opportunity to present arguments on the motion, and there is
nothing

in

the

statute

that

prohibited

the

Plaintiffs

from

appealing the decision of the trial court, and, thus, there is no
abridgement of any right to appeal, or to seek a stay pending
appeal. Although, as this Court noted, Plaintiffs may have erred
when they did not bring a separate appeal, as the attempt to remove
the lis pendens could be deemed an enforcement action. R.852-53.
Any such appeal would now be untimely, and no stay could issue.
The legislature's aim to expedite release of an unsupported
lis pendens is a worthy one. The damages suffered by maintenance of
the notice in this case include possible loss of the sale and the
proceeds from that sale to Gibson and interest on the purchase
price. The longer the lis pendens remains, the greater the risk to
Defendants.
VIII. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTIES AND ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVERY OF THEIR FEES.
In this case, Plaintiffs sought to enforce the Proposed Lease
under the theories of fraud, waiver and promissory estoppel, and,
secondarily, the REPC under the fraud theory. Second Amended
Complaint 55 32-38, R. 467-73. A request was made for fees in the
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Second Amended Complaint, but that claim, which was not pursued
further

prior

to

summary

judgment,

is

now

raised

on

appeal.

Plaintiffs do not argue their fraud theory on appeal. Thus, they
did not and cannot prevail on enforcement of the REPC. Since they
are not the prevailing party, they cannot recover fees under the
R E P C s terms.
CROSS-APPEAL
IX: THE FILING OF THE LIS PENDENS WAS IN BAD FAITH AND
THE REFUSAL TO RELEASE IT CONSTITUTES A WRONGFUL LIEN.
On this issue, the Defendants invite the Court to adopt the
approach of Florida in assessing whether a lis pendens, filed when
a claim is without merit, is a wrongful lien. In India America
Trading, Co. v. White, 896 So. 2d 859, 859

(Fla. App. 3 Dist.

2005), "India America executed a written offer to purchase 120
acres of real property

from Wesley White.'' The offer

required

acceptance by a certain date, and White did not accept the offer
thereby. Jd.. "When White refused to sell the real property to India
America," jld. , India America brought breach of contract and fraud
claims. Id.
The court surmised, however, that "even if White had orally
agreed

to

sell

the

real

property

to

India

America,

contract would have been unenforceable pursuant to

.

the

oral
[the]

statute of frauds." Id. at 860. The court further observed that
"even though the defendant may not have intended to perform the
oral contract at the time when he made the oral promise, the action
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for fraud and deceit could not be maintained based on the statute
of frauds." Id. at 361.
Thus, the court opined that "India America's fraud count [wa]s
nothing more than an action to enforce an oral contract for the
sale of land and therefore, d[id] not constitute a good faith,
viable claim necessary to support a lis pendens." Id. Addressing
the issue of reliance, the court stated:
India America alleged that [it] relied on White's
misrepresentation that he would sell the real property to
India America. However, the record, which includes the
written offer, contradicts this allegation. Specifically,
the written offer provides that the contract is not
binding unless accepted and delivered to White before a
specific date. Therefore, by the terms of its offer,
India America could not have believed that it had a
binding contract based upon their oral communications.
Id.
Similarly, in the case at hand, Plaintiffs abandoned the REPC
and then submitted the Proposed Lease which required acceptance by
November 1, 2004. Proposed Lease, Addendum J, SI 16. Ty acknowledged
that Defendants did not accept the lease option by November 1,
2004. R. 880:48:10-12. Plaintiffs argue that their case is not
frivolous. In White, however, the court came to the opposite
conclusion on similar facts (though there was no oral contract in
the instant case), writing that the "action to enforce an oral
contract for the sale of land . . . d[id] not constitute a good
faith, viable claim necessary to support a lis pendens." 896 So. 2d
at 861.
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In Utah, the wrongful lien statute provides that it "[does]
not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens." Utah Code § 38-92(2).

The Utah Supreme Court has, however, expounded that a "[lis

pendens'] only foundation is the action filed - it has no existence
independent of it." Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190

(1976).

Moreover, "[i]n Utah, a lis pendens may only be filed in connection
with an action (1) 'affecting the title' to real property, or (2)
'affecting

. . . the

right

of possession

Winters v. Schulman, 977 P. 2d 1218, 1223

of real

property.'"

(Utah Ct. App.

1999)

(quoting Utah Code § 78-40-2). " 'Utah law does not allow for the
filing

of a lis pendens

in cases

seeking

a money

judgment.'"

Winters, 977 P.2d at 1224 (quoting Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432,
436 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992)).
It was, therefore, improper

for

Plaintiffs to file a lis

pendens when they could not compel specific performance of the REPC
having not performed under the same. Similarly, as in White, the
filing of a lis pendens in this case, based upon an unaccepted
proposal, was likewise wrongful. Indeed, although the right to file
a

lis pendens

improbable that

seems

quite

broad

under

the

statute,

it

seems

legislators intended to allow any lis pendens,

though technically an allowable filing, to be permissible, if it
was premised upon a frivolous filing.
Additionally,

in the instant case, the trial court

found,

based on the testimony of Plaintiffs at a hearing on November 29,
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that the REPC was not enforceable, that the purchase price had not
been tendered and that the closing date had not been met. R. 47-50.
Following that hearing, a notice was given to Plaintiffs, by a
letter dated December 22, 2004, requesting that their lis pendens
be released and explaining that the filing of the lis pendens was
wrongful, especially in light of the trial court's findings and
ruling.

R.

522-33

(Exhibit

A

therein).

Plaintiffs

refused

to

release the lis pendens.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 provides that if a person refuses to
release a wrongful lien, he or she is liable for treble damages and
reasonable attorney fees and costs. In this case, once the court
ruled that the REPC was not enforceable, Plaintiffs had a duty to
release the lis pendens. A refusal to do so was wrongful, and
Defendants should be awarded treble damages together with their
attorney fees and costs.
Plaintiffs request that this Court rule, as did the Florida
court, that a good faith claim must underpin a lis pendens. In this
case, the REPC was unenforceable and the trial court so ruled in
December 2004. The proposed lease was likewise unenforceable as the
terms were never agreed upon and the document was never signed by
Defendants. Plaintiffs filed the lis pendens to try to prevent
Defendants from selling the property, which was an improper motive.
Defendants are entitled to the damages incurred because of the
improper filing.
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X. DEFENDANTS, AS THE PREVAILING PARTIES, ARE ENTITLED TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF THEIR LEGAL FEES AND COSTS.
The trial court awarded Defendants the fees they incurred in
defending against the injunction request, based on the terms of
Rule 65A regarding preliminary injunctions. The court, however,
denied the request for additional fees under the terms of the REPC,
finding that the REPC had been abandoned by the parties. R. 661-69.
At first blush, the result may seem correct, until one realizes the
policy such a result begets, where, as in this case, Plaintiffs
continue to attempt to enforce the REPC, including on this appeal,
and Defendants have to defend against those claims.
" A In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by
statute or contract. If provided for by contract, attorney fees are
awarded in accordance with the terms of that contract.'" Panos v.
Olsen and Assoc. Constr., Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 822 (Utah Ct. App.
2005) (quoting Foster v. Montgomery, 82 P. 3d 191, 194 (Utah Ct. App.
2003)). Paragraph 17 of the REPC at issue provides: "In the event
of

litigation . . . to enforce the Contract, the prevailing party

shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees."
In this case, Plaintiffs sought to enforce the REPC under a
fraud theory. Second Amended Complaint M

32-38, R. 467-473. They

have also, following summary judgment, sought damages for breach of
that contract. Hence, although Plaintiffs efforts were generally
focused on having the court bind Defendants to the Proposed Lease,
to which they had not agreed and which they were still negotiating,
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Plaintiffs did allege that the REPC should be enforced under the
fraud theory to which Defendants had to mount a successful defense,
and Defendants continue to have to set forth arguments against
Plaintiffs' claims raised both before and after summary judgment.
Carr buttresses the conclusion that Defendants should be
awarded their attorney fees. In Carr, the plaintiff requested
specific performance of a purchase contract. This Court upheld the
trial

court's

decision

denying

specific

performance,

due to

nonperformance of contract terms by the plaintiff. 781 P. 2d at
1296. The Court then addressed the issue of attorney fees. Id.
The fees provision in the contract stated:

M>

If either party

fails to perform, he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing

this

agreement,

or of any right arising out of the breach thereof,

including

a

reasonable

attorney's

fee.'"

id.

(Emphasis

in

original). The Court, applying this language, concluded that Smith
was not entitled to attorney fees, because "Smith took an entirely
defensive posture and was not enforcing any right arising under the
agreement or arising from a breach thereof." Id.
However, while the Court determined that "[Smith] [wa]s not
entitled to attorney fees under the provision at issue," id. ,
because the provision was "not comprehensive but . . . limited in
scope," id., the Court proclaimed that "Smith would surely be
entitled to attorney fees under the more typical provision awarding
fees to the prevailing party." id. Supplying an example of such a
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proviso, the Court referred to Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v.
Neale, 776 P. 2d 643

(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Id. The attorney fee

section of the agreement in this case and the provision in Neale
are almost identical.
The Neale provision reads: "In the event of commencement of
suit by either party to enforce the provisions of this agreement,
the prevailing
and

party

costs

Similarly,

shall be entitled to receive attorney's fees
." 776

P.2d

at

648

(emphasis

in

original).

the REPC in the instant case states: "In the event of

litigation . . .

to enforce this Contract, the prevailing party

shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees."

Addendum

I, 1 17.
Neale also offers this straightforward insight: "[T]ypically,
determining the ^prevailing party' for purposes of awarding fees
and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant; if plaintiff
is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, defendant has
prevailed." Id., at 648. In this case, as outlined above, Plaintiffs
did not receive their requested relief. Defendants, meanwhile, have
"successfully defend[ed]." Id.
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that no fees could be
awarded

because

the

contract

became

unenforceable

due

to

nonperformance and abandonment by the parties. R. 661-669. However,
in Carr, the defending party's "position . . . was that there was
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no viable contract left to enforce/' Ici. at 1296. Yet, this Court
averred that "Smith would surely be entitled to attorney fees under
the . . . typical provision awarding fees to the prevailing party."
Id. This result promotes a policy that protects parties who must
defend against an otherwise unenforceable contract, and holds
accountable parties who seek to enforce an otherwise unenforceable
contract. Without such a policy, a party who successfully defends
in a contract action might never be able to recover fees.
Finally, Defendants are not only entitled to attorney fees for
proceedings before the trial court, but also before this Court,
should Defendants prevail on appeal, in accordance with the REPC's
terms. Panos, 123 P.3d at 822 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (awarding fees
on appeal under a like provision). Thus, Defendants respectfully
request that this Court reverse the trial court's decision as to
attorney fees, and award Defendants the fees incurred before the
trial court and this Court to defend against Plaintiffs' action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request
that the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for the
Defendants, thereby dismissing

the Plaintiffs' Second Amended

Complaint, be sustained, that the trial court's ruling as to
wrongful lien be reversed and that the case be remanded with
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direction to award Defendants the attorney fees and costs incurred
before the trial court and on appeal.
Dated this

^Z f

day of November 2006,
ALLRED ^McCiELLAN, P.C,
Attorneys.for Appellee

By: /

.y^ttk

_

\Claf1c B Alfred
By:
Brad D. Brotherson
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4
Excerpts from Transcripts of Temporary Injunction Hearing
November 29, 2004
Ruling and Order, January 11, 2006
Ruling and Order, March 29, 2006
Order, April 26, 2006
Ruling, May 15, 2006
Ruling and Order, August 16, 2006
Ruling and Order, November 21, 2006
Real Estate Purchase Contract, August 27, 2004
Residential Lease With Option to Purchase, October 5, 2004

ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4
Civil liability for filing wrongful lien - Damages
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien
as defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office
of the county recorder against real property is liable to a record
interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by the
wrongful lien.
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to
release or correct the wrongful lien within ten days from the date
of written request from a record interest holder of the real
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address
of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest
holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is
greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for
reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or causes
to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-91 in the office of the county recorder against the real property,
knowing or having reason to know that the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim

ADDENDUM B

II

Page 1 i

1

Q.

What i s y o u r c u r r e n t

occupation?

2

A.

We're s e l f - e m p l o y e d .

We own a c a r p e t and u p h o l s t e r y

3 cleaning business.
4

Q.

You s a y we, you mean you and y o u r w i f e ?

5

A.

My w i f e and I .

6

Q.

And how long have you had the carpet cleaning and

7

flupholstery

Yes.

business?

8

A.

This i s

the eighth year.

9

Q.

Are y o u a r e a l e s t a t e

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Do you have any college education in real estate?

12 II

A.

None .

13

Q.

Is your wife, excuse me, did you say your wife works

professional?

14 jwith you in the business?
15 II

A.

16

Q.

She does work with us.

Yes.

And did there come a time when you were looking for

17 [property in Duchesne County?

18 I

A. Yes.

19

Q.

And tell us how you found the property.

20

A.

I was searching the internet.

21

Q.

And you found, describe what you found on the

22 internet.
23

A.

I found the ranch for sale in Neola.

24

Q.

Did you contact anybody in regards to this?

25

A.

Yes.

1 II

Q.

Who did you contact 9

2

A.

I contacted Jim.

He had his cell phone number on the

3 [website.
4

Q.

And when did you make these contacts 9

5

A,

It: was in late July or early August.

6

Q.

And tell me the substance of your first

conversation

7 [with Mr. Farnsworth.
8 11

A.

I basically just asked him that I was interested in

9 the property and wanted to go take a look at it.

He gave m e

10 directions on how to drive out and find it and ray wife and I
11 drove out and found it and toured the property.
12

Q.

At what time, did there come a time when you

actually

13flmetwith M r . Farnsworth?
14

A.

After we toured it we were real interested in it and

15 it was more than we expected so we made arrangements to meet
16 with him to get the key to the house.

W e met in Heber City and

17 the next day we drove out and toured the inside of the house.
18

Q.

And about when was this 9

19

A.

I believe that was on the-fifteenth roughly.

It was a

20 Sunday that we drove up.
21

Q.

About the fifteenth of August.

22

A.

Of August.

23 II

Q.

So you toured the property.

Is that correct?

You liked the property.

24 |t)id you get back in touch with Mr. Farnsworth
25 ||

A.

The next time, yes.

again 0

We talked on the phone back and

1 II

A.

The date that he prepared it or signed it, looks

2 [lit was the twenty-fourth of August.

like

And then we signed it a

3 few days later.
4

Q.

Okay.

This happened at the end August.

Did you have

5 another meeting with Mr. Farnsworth after this time?
6

A.

We met him at the property, and again it would have

7 Dbeen on a weekend, and we walked through the property.
8 of showed me a little bit about the watering system.

He kind
But

9 mainly that was to clarify any of the personal property issues
10 that we had.
11

Q.

Did you discuss what personal property was going to go

12 flwith the farm?
13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Give us some short idea of what was being included

15 with the sale according to our understanding.
16

A.

17 name it.

All of the furniture in the home.

I mean dishes, you

Everything that was on the property including some of

18 the farm equipment.

A baler, hay-wagon, frother, four wheeler,

19 three wheeler.
20
21 One.

Q.

Let me direct your attention to Plaintiffs Exhibit

At the top there is an indication of an earnest money

22 amount of a thousand dollars.

Did you provide a check in the

23 amount of a thousand dollars?
24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And where was that delivered?

Page 2;
A

2

Q.

T

lr-?i i t - - -

*•'•

c

. <2».t

_ t.

t_

J^ii..

And it says on here it was received by Basin Land and

3 Title.
4

A.

That's who the check was made out to

That was the

5 title company that we were working on.
6

Q.

Okay.

And then there's a description of the property

7 and then a short description of some excluded items.
8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

If you go down to paragraph two, there's a purchase

10 {price.

The amount has been scratched through of three hundred

forty thousand and three hundred and thirty-nine thousand with
12 some initials.

Do you know whose initials those are?

13

A.

Those are Jim's.

14

Q.

Okay.

And that reflects the change in the final

15 [purchase price?
16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Paragraph 2.3 requires application for financing.

18 that was to be done (inaudible) representation by September
19 first.

Did you make a loan application prior to September

20 first?
21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And who did you apply with?

23

A.

Washington Mutual.

24

Q.

And what did they tell you''

25

A.

Initially told us that everything looked good.

Our

And

We' ri dnne work with them before

iicredit was excellent-

Tins

roperty was larger than, what they normally loan on but they,
tht-> linn oj finer saxd with our credit that the underwriter
should be able to make an exception on this property.
Q.

Did there come a time whei i Washington Mutual

objected

to making the loan?
A

Yes,,.
"I'll.!- 1 I

II "«

Whl , I I

111 i l i p l H !'I

M.I .

They notified i is tl lat

1 J: ie

we] 1

actually what

IO||happened that the appraiser was supposed to go apprai.se the
1 1 ([property and I guess he or she talked
12 appraiser .found out that i t was a working
1.3 j

MF

A LLREE

14 getting some hearsay
15

Objed

n and once the,
t H rm.
1 t ;if>pea I s wt~> ' i v

(. i i ai i :i i b l e )

(inaudible) some appraiser.

THE COURT: Well, if it came from Jim, we're going

.o

16 let him talk about it.
17

MR. ALLRED:

I understood he was talking about

what

1 8 (but some appraiser was I e L 1 j rig him .
19

THE COURT:

20 B Y IMI'M
21

Okay.

hUNlM;iM- H

Q

-*

\e just clarify that, •Your Hoi lor

22 p e no misunders1 ai i< i i i :ig .

U 1 1 i m a 1 1 * 1 ;;;fl ; i h a t

So there wi 1 1

:Ii d W a s 1 iii igt : »n Mut:ua,1

23 tell you?
24

A

That they wouldn't loan on a working farm.

25 II

Q.

Did that cause you great concern 9

Q.

D i d y o u clc a n y t h i n g

else

to

c/btaifi

financing

DM Lh^

Q.

Were y o u u l t i m a t e l y

able

to o b t a i n

6

A

Y^s.

7

Q.

And who offered to provide that financing for you?

roperty1

ultimate

financing

8 (What financial institution?
9

A.

Through American National.

10

Q.

Did you relay any of this information to M r .

II Farnsworth?
12

A.

W e l l , in between that, we had started talking to Wells

13 (Fargo, Zions and Western

(inaudible) Credit and we, I mean the^

14 [wanted us to put up a big proposal on how we' re going to m a k e
15 [money farming.

I talked to Jim about that I actually asked him

16 to help m e draw up a, you know, a business plan to make money
17

on the farm.

18

[you know, we would get this property one way or another and

19
20
21

But I also told him at about the same time that,

then I started mentioning to him different financing options.
[And the lease option was one of them.
Q.

Did Mr. Farnsworth indicate to you that they had any

9
22 interest in that lease option

23

A.

Initially not much.

I mean, but he called me back a

24 day or two later and said he really lxked the idea of the lease
option.

i~i

J f c
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He liked the idea because if we defaulted on it he

wouldn't Iiavi" t»> f i >r *>r 1 ose .
still be I n his name
an opportunity

i! wt i I .1

i, t , everything

would

And I really liked it because it gave me

to do a ten thirty one Rxrhanqe mi arini her

piece

6 of property that I currently own.
7

: :i

(

- J..M, commence discussions with him about the

8 ter
9

A

10

Q.

Extensively.
L e t m e s h o w y o u a dt

11 E x h i b i t
12

A

13

Q

14

*

17 o f

^ yon r e c o g n i z e

,

I i" I I l l n

t o J i m t<> limit

f^ h a p p e n .

t h i s purchase

18

the
:

u v f i,

l i r , b»>i 11 IIIL -J r k( i i i

document?

this

document

is°

L e a s e o p t i o n t h a t we* p r e p a r e d

iinl M u i i . i«.»Mil

We a l r e a d y a g r e e d

wu t h o u g h t w a s

in p r i n c i p l e

to

the

terms

agreement.

'here a r e

19 d o c u m e n t .

this

wlin-h

< i MI i t bhftal

"I h i s i JI t h e copy of

15 t o s e n d
16 g o i n g

n

v*,^

uini'tit

signatures

Can you t e l l

on t h e s e c o n d p a g e o f

~n._se s i g n a t u r e s

those

this

are?

20 II

A.

T l i n r , i ' a i t ; mi i in

2111

Q.

And t h e r e ' s

22 t h i

*i -\u | »i y p t i ! i" 1 }

23||

A.

-4 II
ever

Q.
At any t i m e p r i o r t o November f i r s t d i d Mr. F a r n s w o r t h
t e l l you t h a t he r e f u s e d t o e n t e r i n t o a l e a s e o p t i o n

a date,

mv w i f e ' s
October f i f t h .

Is

this

tlle

date

Yes

3
4 HMr

A.

No.

Q.

At any time prior to November first did you ever

Farnsworth

tell

f.hat- you ^nnld not arrange financing to purchase

5 the property?
6

A.

No.

7

Q.

If Mr. Farnsworth had told you at any time that he

8 would not do the lease option, did you believe you had other
9 financing options available to you?
10

A.

Sure.

11

Q.

And that included a commitment from American

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Concerning Plaintiffs Exhibit Number Two, you

National

12 Bank?

stated

15 that set forth the terms that you had discussed with M r .
16 [Farnsworth.

Did Mr. Farnsworth ever make or suggest any

17 amendments to these terms?
18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

What changes did he suggest?

20

A.

Initially when he got the contract he called me and

21 he, we were going to make some changes to the timing on the
22 payments for the lease, basically to protect me in case
23 something was lost in the mail that the option would not expire
24 immediately.

There would be a longer term, you know, just so

25 the option wouldn't disappear.
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t

A nd i n f o r m a t i o n ?

When you s e n t

t h a t , wha tlf d y c »u d o ^

t< :: • J:i i i FVi t n swi i r t h ?
YP«?

5

Q_

He said, he initially showed no xnterest in xt but

6 later di*^
7 II

A.

All the terms of this agreement we. had hashed out over

8 (Ion t h e L e l e p h u i i ^

I \m

W< • .i<;) f ee<.l

.• m a yl h i m )

i 11 I h i •• i.niil" t a c t

9 {before I submitted it to him.
Q.

10

Your testimony* was tnau ixe showed no interest but

1 1 later said that he, that it did some interest to hi m because I
12 remember you were interested because of a ten twenty-three
13

(i,i ia.ii ii J :i fal e )

I s s ::i t ?

I /a: s I

(. i I. n ic I i bJ e) ?

14

A.

Okay.

Before this was ever prepared.

15

Q.

that was before October

16

A.

When, I was talking to Wei Is Fargo, Zi ons and Western

17 (inaudible) Cred i t,.
18 telephone P** weJ J

(inautfxbis}

• • • talking back ai id f or th to w .
Ana ~, it was kind of frustratinc

19 with those banks because they wanted, they were loan i •»
20 prnoi i e y

t J i nil

i I i i in i I'M) pHi ,'iOpc I i i-

1 ili nt

I Ii i v i • a n y

>T

L 1 ie

sealing
tK.t*
•c e

21 farming so you know, I talked to Jim, I said "Jim, worse case
^ ? Is e n a r i o

r

w eir v e

.

-:

I

<•' c 1 i a s e

t.! i e j: > i: c • p e r t y ''

23 I started throwing up some of the worst case senarios, that's
24 llowner financing.
Q.

I understand.

K-uv 4S

Q.

I'm

just trying to figure out, you said you preparer

Exhibit Two and mailed it to him sometime on or after October
f:^^u. .?"d *-hf»n yon said that there were, and then you started
having, it's my understanding that you had discussions after
6 that in timing terms, and what we're really looking at is you
7 discussed changing the line sixteen where you put a November
8 first, two thousand four date for an acceptance.
9 about changing that.

You talked

My understanding was you then,

you

10 [mailed it to Mr. Farnsworth and had some discussion about
11 changing some of the terms.
12

A.

Some of the information, we talked on the telephone

13 about some of the terms when he got it.
14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

They were, I mean, I hadn't modified this generic

16 contract so the terms were as what we talked about.

And I

17 talked about the one item of the payment being late.
18

Q.

W e l l , you talked as I understood it, changing the date

19 for acceptance, who's paying the water, who pays the taxes,
20 those things all occured after you mailed this and sent it to
21 him?

Is my understanding correct there?

22

Q.

He just wanted those items specifically

23

Q.

Did you ever reach an agreement on any of those terms?

24

h,

Absolutely

25

Q.

Then you said that, I guess you decided to look in the

included.
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see youi

-jnature on it.

Was it ever signed by any of

the

[Defendants?
3 I

I

4 1

Q

5 11

A.

INU.

"6 ||

0

You sa id that the twenty-fourth came and past and y < : • i i

ou » - v e r r e c e i v e d a s i g n e d copy of

7 | (inaudible) set a date to eJt ose the
8 ||

A

!

"W"„,t', ui'idi?Ie

l o c o i i t ax I

It 11

• 9 II

Q

At any time prior to October

that'7

lease?
-

waq out-

of

^own.

twen t y - f oux t n

.d ,*<»u

10 ever take a check to Basin Lane
11

*

No,

12

I.ltd you e v e r

t a k e t h e money t o B a s i n Land and

Title?

13

1\

14

Did y oi i ever send any of the Defendants a check for

15 the closinq p:II i ce?
16

A.

No... They only had the earnest money.

17

Q.

As of , as of October fifth , you had replaced y oi n

18 estate purchase contract wi th Exh. i b:i t Two, the lease

i: ea 3

Wasn t.

19 lit?
20

A,

*

lought was happening.

21

Q.

And .actually y ou had changed, the original closing

22 date, thi/i'p" M .ui acceptance date of sixteen which is November
23 Hone t .wo thousand lour.
24

A.

That's correct

25

Q.

So when you called, you said you called him on the

Q

And you had not obtained any loan for the property.

2 Had you?
3

A.

That's correct.

4

Q.

As of October twenty-fourth, you didn't have a loan

5 for it.

Did you?

6

A.

I had financing available.

7

Q.

You say you have a commitment that's dated in

8 [November.

That's all you've got.

9

A.

That's correct.

And I could have closed this.

10

Q.

And you've never tendered one dime to anybody.

Had

11 |you?
12

A.

Other than the earnest money. I've never tendered an

13 [(money.
14

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

IBY MR. LUNDGREN:
Q.

I draw your attention to Exhibit Number One.

the document you signed first for the property.

That is

Is that

Icorrect?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then during the period of time that you were

23 obtaining financing, is it your testimony that you had
24 understood that Mr. Farnsworth preferred the lease option?
25

A.

Would you restate that question?

Page 5C
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2 jwhether
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1 J

yn ''

a "

LO

jo mi a cash purchase or whether he would

3 [prefer going on a lease option?
4

A

Not necessarily.

But he did call me back and tell m e

5 that he liked the idea of the lease option while I was pursuing
6 th e c a s h f i n a n c i n g .
7

y

Was

8 |Farn'•;wn r t It

il your

m t e n t during your discussions with M r .

i 11 «"

9 (discussions with Mr

d e r s t a n d i i lg ::i i :i y o u r •
Farnsworth that by entering into the leane

10 option that any of your rights under the purchase ag
11 [would be cancelled?
12

A

13

Q

11J

">„ u have an understanding that i £ the lease option

14 |did not work out as to whether oz not the purchase option was

15 stil I aval I aLi. I e?
16

Yes.

'I assumed that it was and I specificall

17 Ihim that x wanted to execute the iear;p

'pi i , MilLiii

told
.M

18 frame of the original purchase contract.
19

».

If at any time after October twentieth, Mr. Farnsworth

20 |would have stated to you you've got to come up with the three
21 hundred and thirty-nine thousand dollars, would you have been
22 ial.
23
24

25

to do that ?
Yes .
i whom ?
_ good friend, Mr. Paul Ensalmi, that just walked into
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JAN 1 1 2005

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASE NO. 040800079

JAMES L. FARNSWORTH, DAVID
FARNSWORTH, and GREGORY
FARNSWORTH,

JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. That motion was filed with the Court on
August 26, 2005, and was accompanied by a supporting memorandum.
The Plaintiffs filed a memo in opposition to that motion on November 01, 2005. The Plaintiffs' opposition memo also included
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court notes
that it has not yet received a request for a decision on Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Defendants filed
with the Court a reply memo on their motion for summary judgment
on November 14, 2005, which included a request for oral argument
on the motion. The Court entertained oral argument on December
19, 2005, and having received a notice to submit this motion for
decision on November 18, 2005, the Court now issues its ruling
and enters its order on the Defendants' summary judgment motion.
This case started when the parties entered into a real estate purchase contract ("the REPC,/) on August 24, 2004, which
contract was to close by October 24, 2004. As part of an order
entered on December 20, 2004, the Court has previously made
1
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findings that the Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining
financing for the transaction and the parties began discussing
alternative means to finance the transaction. See Order, pg. 2
(filed December 21, 2004). It appears that the Plaintiffs suggested a lease with an option to purchase ("the Lease Option")
in lieu of obtaining conventional financing to purchase the
property outright.1 The parties began negotiating the terms of
the Lease Option sometime in the middle of September and continued to negotiate beyond the October 24, 2004 closing date specified in the REPC. Ultimately, no lease with an option to purchase was ever signed by the parties and the REPC never closed
within the timeframe established by the REPC. In November 2004,
the Defendants sold the property which was the subject of the
REPC to a third party.
The Plaintiffs brought suit against the Defendants for
breach of contract, seeking: 1) specific performance of the
REPC; 2) an injunction barring the sale of the property; and 3)
damages and costs. The Plaintiffs have subsequently amended
their complaint to include the following causes of action: 1)
waiver; 2) fraud; and 3) promissory estoppel. Based upon those
theories, the Plaintiffs are still seeking specific performance
of the REPC or the Lease Option.2 There are three issues the
Court must address in order to rule upon the Defendants' summary
judgment motion: 1) the statute of frauds as it relates to
Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim; 2) the Plaintiffs' fraud
claim; and 3) waiver issues. Each will be addressed in turn.

1

Conventional financing was specified in the REPC. See "Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," Exhibit C (filed August 26,
2005).
2

In their Second Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiffs' "Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform with the Evidence," filed on
December 13, 2005, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to "order the Defendants to
enter into, complete and honor the lease option agreement" OR "alternately
allow the Plaintiffs to complete the purchase agreement with conventional financing . "
2
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I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS and PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Statutes of frauds are intended to bar enforcement of certain agreements that the law requires to be memorialized in
writing. The relevant statute of frauds reads:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005). Both of the contracts at issue
in this action, 1) the REPC which was entered into by the parties in august 2004 and 2) the Lease Option which was never executed between the parties, are required by the express language
of the statute to be memorialized in writing to be enforceable.
Because the REPC was in writing, it satisfied the statute
of frauds and was therefore an enforceable agreement between the
parties. However, neither of the parties to the REPC performed
under the terms of that agreement.3 It appears that once the
Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining the conventional financing specified in the REPC, and began negotiating the Lease
Option instead, the REPC was abandoned by both parties. Either
way, it is clear from the record that the date for settlement
under the REPC passed without full performance by either party.
While the parties are free to sue each other for defaulting under the REPC, seeking specific performance (an equitable remedy)
requires "clean hands," see LHIW, Inc. v. De Lorean, 753 P.2d
961, 963 (Utah 1988), which, due to non-performance, neither of
the parties possesses under the REPC.
Furthermore, because the Lease Option was never reduced to
writing and signed by the Defendants, it cannot satisfy the
statute of frauds and therefore is unenforceable. The Plain3

The Defendants apparently did not provide seller disclosures or title commitments.
See "Plaintiffs' Cross Motion," pg. 3 (filed November 01, 2005).
Similarly, the Plaintiffs never tendered the purchase price.
See "Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," pg . 4 (filed
August 26, 2005) .
3
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tiffs argue that the Lease Option should be enforced regardless
of the statute of frauds based upon a theory of promissory estoppel. The Utah Supreme Court has defined promissory estoppel,
stating:
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or
a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may
be limited as justice requires.
Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843,
845 (Utah 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1981)). Under this definition, the Plaintiffs would be entitled to the relief they seek if they could establish a promise,
reasonable reliance, and injustice.
However, there are limits to the doctrine of promissory estoppel when real property is involved.
These limits have been
addressed by the Utah courts. In support of their motion for
summary judgment, Defendants cite F.C. Stangle v. Earnst Home
Centers, 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997). In Stangle, the Utah
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of "whether, promissory estoppel precludes [a defendant] from asserting the statute of
frauds as a defense." Stangle, 948 P.2d at 360. This issue is
a matter of law, properly decided by this Court on summary judgment. I_ci. The Stangle court stated,
in situations involving the purchase or lease of real property, [] Utah cases have narrowly circumscribed the application of promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds. A
defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds
as a defense only when he or she has expressly and unambiguously waived the right to do so.
Stangle, 948 P.2d at 360-61 (emphasis added). Moreover, a mere
refusal to perform an oral agreement within the statute of
frauds, however, is not such fraud as will justify a court in
disregarding the statute of frauds even though it results in
hardship to the plaintiff. See id. at 362.
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In this case,
the Plaintiffs are asking this Court to require the Defendants to perform under an oral agreement (the
Lease Option). As applied to this case, Stanqle instructs that
this Court cannot disregard the statute of frauds, even though
it appears that the Plaintiffs may suffer some hardship as a result of such judgment. If this Court were to to accept the
Plaintiffs' estoppel argument,
parties to a contract negotiation could not rely on the
protections afforded by the statute of frauds, thereby
eviscerating it. Moreover, contract negotiators would never
know at what point mere negotiations became a binding contract. Parties to contract negotiations should be entitled
to rely on the statute of frauds absent a clear manifestation of intent to claim no reliance.
A party concerned
about the assertion of the statute of frauds could easily
protect itself by demanding written commitments before acting in reliance on the negotiations.
id. at 365.
The Court finds that Stanqle controls in this case. At no
time did the Defendants' conduct "clearly manifest an intention
that [they] would not assert the statute of frauds." Ld. Regardless of the fact that no written lease was ever memorialized, and the fact that both parties had apparently abandoned
the REPC sometime in September 2004, the Plaintiffs gambled that
the Lease Option negotiations would be successfully concluded.
Even if this Court found that the Defendants assured the Plaintiffs that they would enter into the Lease Option with the
Plaintiffs, "a mere promise to execute a written contract and a
subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage is
sustained as a consequence of the refusal." I_d. To be clear,
promissory estoppel bars a defendant from asserting the statute
of frauds as a defense only where the party has clearly and unequivocally represented that it would not use it as a defense.
See id. at 365-66. Accordingly, because the Defendants did not
represent that they would not assert the statute of frauds as a
defense, the Defendants are not estopped from doing so. This
holds true even though the Defendants refused to enter into the
Lease Option, which they had negotiated in lieu of the REPC.

5
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Because the Defendants are not barred from asserting the statute
of frauds as a defense, and because the Lease Option was within
the statute of frauds, the same is void because it was not in
writing. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005).
II. FRAUD
To establish fraud under Utah law, the plaintiff must prove
by clear and convincing evidence each of the following elements:
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which was false, (4)which
the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity,
(7) did in fact rely upon the representation, and (8) was
thereby induced to act upon it, (9) to his injury and damage .
See Franco v. the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
2001 UT 25, 533. In addition, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
require that all averments of fraud be stated with particularity. URCP Rule 9(a)(3); see also Wright and Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1297, at 590 (1990).
First, the Plaintiffs have made general allegations of
fraud. Plaintiffs have claimed that the "Defendants misled the
Plaintiffs into believing that the Defendants preferred a lease
option," knowing that if they could delay closing on the property under the REPC, Plaintiffs would default and the Defendants
could then accept a more lucrative offer from another party.
See "Second Amended Complaint," pg. A (permission to amend
granted at oral argument on December 19, 2005). These allegations of fraud are insufficient under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, as they do not possess
the requisite particularity required by statute.
The Plaintiffs also allege specific instances of fraud, but
only regarding events which transpired after the October 24,
2004 REPC closing deadline. These specific instances of alleged
fraud involved a "fabricated" realtor commission, which the
6
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Plaintiffs argue was fabricated by Defendants to avoid having
the Plaintiffs demand closing on the REPC. See "Plaintiffs'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, at pg. 12 (filed November 01,
2005). Under Utah law, to be fraudulent, a representation must
concern a "presently existing material fact." See Franco, 2001
UT 25, 3133. After October 24, 2004, any fraudulent representations allegedly made by the Defendants would be immaterial to
the REPC, since its closing date had already passed and the parties had not agreed, in writing, to an extension of any of the
deadlines specified in the REPC.
Second, "fraud, generally, cannot be predicated upon the
failure to perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable
under the statute of frauds, for the promissor has not, in a legal sense, made a contract; and therefore, he has the right,
both in law and equity, to refuse to perform." Stanqle, 948
P.2d at 362. This means that any claim of fraud predicated upon
the Lease Option, or representations made regarding the Lease
Option, are insufficient as a matter of law, because the Lease
Option is void under the statute of frauds.
Additionally, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs have argued that, as part of the Lease Option negotiations, Defendant
James Farnsworth "made suggestions to modify the Lease Option
Agreement." See "Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment," at pg. 8 (filed November 01, 2005). The Plaintiffs indicate that these modifications were suggested on October 9, 2004.
Id. Plaintiffs argue that
the only logical explanation is that Jim was acting in good
faith to bring about the terms of the Lease Option to a
fair and final agreement. Unless Jim had a bona fide intention to pursue the Lease Option, there would have been
no reason to suggest a change in a term which would benefit the Eldridges.
Id. The Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways, arguing in one
breath that negotiating the Lease Option was a ploy to avoid a
demand for performance of the REPC AND that the Defendants were
sincere in their desire to find Lease Option terms which would
be amenable to both parties. Such arguments appear to this
Court to be diametrically opposed; either the Defendants were
7
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negotiating the Lease Option fraudulently or they were negotiating with good faith. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds
that the Plaintiffs fraud claims are insufficient as a matter of
law.
III. WAIVER
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). In this case, both parties had rights against the other party by virtue of the REPC.
Those rights are independent of the proposed Lease Option which
never materialized and never provided any rights to the Plaintiffs or the Defendants.
The Plaintiffs acknowledge that "the Defendants had a right
to rely on the REPC." "Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment," pg. 15. The Plaintiffs also acknowledge that "when
the parties agreed to proceed with the Lease Option, they waived
their right to proceed with the REPC...they relinquished their
right to the REPC..." Id.
The Court is of the opinion that
both parties abandoned the REPC sometime in September 2004. In
doing so, both parties would have intentionally relinquished
known rights under the REPC. Regardless, the fact that the parties had waived rights under the REPC does not in any way make
the Lease Option a binding agreement between these parties. The
fact of the matter is that even if the Defendants intentionally
relinquished all of their rights under the REPC, the Lease Option was never memorialized in writing and signed by the Defendants. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' waiver argument is also insufficient as a matter of law.

ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Additionally, even though the
Court has not received a request for a decision on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, that motion is hereby DE8
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NIED. This is a direct result of granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and is done now in an effort to resolve the matter and to ensure consistent rulings in this matter.
Dated this

f/^^day

of

JOHN R. ANDERSON,

9 OF 9

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040800079 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

ALVIN R LUNDGREN
ATTORNEY PLA
5015 W OLD HWY STE 200
MT GREEN, UT 84050

By Hand
Dated this

day o

CLARK B ALLRED

r™o£.

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)

ADDENDUM D

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
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By^—VTx
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,

1
RULING and ORDER

Plaintiffs,

vs.
|
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH,

CASE NO. 040800079
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Reconsider," filed with the Court an
January 30, 2006; 2) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Extend the Time to
Appeal/' filed with the Court on February 14, 2006; 3) Plaintiffs' "Objections to the Order Submitted by Defendants Without
Notice or Motion Dated January 12, 2006," filed with the Court
on January 18, 2006; and 4) Defendants' "Motion to Award Fees
and Costs," filed with the Court on January 18, 2006. The Court
has reviewed these motions and the memoranda in support of, and
in opposition to, each respective motion. The Court has also
reviewed the Plaintiffs' objections to the-Defendants' proposed
order. Having received notice to submit these motions for decision, and being informed in the matter, the Court will now address each of the motions and the objections in turn.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
While the Court does have discretion in determining whether
to reconsider an order so long as no final judgment has entered,
see Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 518 (citing U.P.C., Inc. v. R.Q.C. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 9155;
1 of 8
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Utah R. C i v . P. 54 ( b ) ) , t h e Utah Supreme Court h a s p o i n t e d o u t
t h a t s u c h m o t i o n s a r e not r e c o g n i z e d by t h e r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e
in c i v i l c a s e s and has d i s c o u r a g e d t h e f i l i n g of such m o t i o n s .
The Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure do not recognize motions
to r e c o n s i d e r . Although we have discouraged t h e s e motions,
they have p r o l i f e r a t e d in c i v i l a c t i o n s to the e x t e n t t h a t
they have become the cheatgrass of the l i t i g a t i o n l a n d s c a p e . We acknowledge t h a t the e x t r a o r d i n a r y circumstance
may a r i s e when i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e to request a t r i a l c o u r t
to r e c o n s i d e r a r u l i n g . These occasions are r a r e , however,
and we encourage a t t o r n e y s t o r e v e r s e the trend to make mot i o n s t o reconsider r o u t i n e .
Shipman v , E v a n s , 2004 UT 44, 518 n . 5 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .
The
Utah Supreme Court n o t e s t h a t t h e r e a r e , on r a r e o c c a s i o n , e x t r a o r d i n a r y circumstances warranting a request for a t r i a l court
to reconsider a ruling.
However, t h e C o u r t c a n n o t s e e , and t h e
P l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t , any r e a s o n as t o why t h e s e
p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e e x t r a o r d i n a r y such t h a t t h e i r mot i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r s h o u l d be g r a n t e d .
Therefore, t h i s Court
w i l l not e n t e r t a i n the P l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o r e c o n s i d e r as i t
r e l a t e s t o any i s s u e a l r e a d y e x p l i c i t l y a d d r e s s e d by t h e C o u r t
i n i t s J a n u a r y 1 1 , 2006 r u l i n g .
In t h a t r u l i n g , t h e Court a d d r e s s e d each c a u s e of a c t i o n
i d e n t i f i e d i n P l a i n t i f f s ' >s Second Amended C o m p l a i n t , " 1 The Court
g r a n t e d P l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o f i l e t h e amended c o m p l a i n t a t o r a l
argument on December 19, 2005, and s i g n e d an o r d e r on t h a t mot i o n J a n u a r y 1 1 , 2006. "Once a p a r t y h a s amended a p l e a d i n g ,
t h e amended p l e a d i n g s u p e r s e d e s t h a o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g , and t h e
o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g p e r f o r m s no f u n c t i o n i n t h e c a s e . "
Campbell
v, Debry, 2001 UT App 397, 517 n . 4 ( c i t i n g 6 F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e &
The P l a i n t i f f s second amended complaint also sought "alternate recovery,"
arguing that i t would be "unconscionable for th© Defendants to profit from
their intentional deceit.'' Id. at pg. 6. The Court did not explicitly address t h i s in i t s January 11, 2006 ruling. However, a review of the record
shows nothing material upon which to make a finding of intentional deceit on
the part of the Defendants. The Court has already ruled that, as a matter of
law, the P l a i n t i f f s ' fraud claims f a i l . By doing so, the Court intended to
include in that ruling the Plaintiffs' claims for "intentional deceit." Further, a review of the record indicates that the Plaintiffs have failed to argue anything in support of their claim for alternate recovery.
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Procedure, Wright, Miller & Kane § 1476 (1990); see also Moore's
Federal Practice, Civil § 15.17 (3) ("An amended pleading that is
complete in itself and does not reference or adopt any portion
of the prior pleading supersede$ the prior pleading.")). Therefore, any cause of action contained in the original complaint or
the first amended complaint, but not contained in the Second
Amended Complaint, "performs no function in the case." Campbell, 2001 UT App 397, 517 n.4.
Having addressed each of the causes of action in the second
amended complaint explicitly, the Court will not revisit them in
any detail. In addition to the issues explicitly ruled upon by
the Court, there are also certain issues raised by the Plaintiffs in their motion to reconsider which, as a result of granting Defendants7 motion for summary judgment, have been implicitly ruled upon by the Court. In order to bring clarity to
those issues, the Court will briefly explicate for the benefit
of the complaining party.
The Plaintiffs' argue that the Court's January 11, 2006
ruling "summarily dismissed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment without explanation." See Plaintiffs' "Memorandum in
Support of Their Motion to Reconsider," pg. 2 (filed January 30,
2006). The Plaintiffs argue that they are
entitled to an explanation of the Court's reasons for denying their motion, including each issus addressed by the
Plaintiffs,, not raised in the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, including Plaintiffs' motion for specific
performance; [sic] and Plaintiffs' motion to deny Defendants' request to find the lis pendens a wrongful lien.
Id, The Court will discuss damages, specific performance, and
the lis pendens.
Before discussing damages and specific performance individually, the Court wishes to raise the following general point
as it relates to both damages and specific performance. The
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that
[n] either party to an agreement can be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a
decree far specific performance) until the other party has
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tendered his own performance. In other words, a party must
make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put
the other party in default.
Kelley v. Leudacia Financial Corp., 846 P,2d 1238, 1243 (Utah
1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because
there is no indication that either of the parties tendered their
own agreed performance under the REPC, neither the Plaintiffs or
the Defendants are in a position to compel specific performance
or recover damages. The Court is persuaded by the Defendants'
argument on this point. See Defendants' "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider," pg. 4 thru 11 (filed
February 10, 2006).
A. DAMAGES
In the Plaintiffs7 second amended complaint, they seek
"reasonable compensation for the damages, actual, consequential,
and incidental, sustained by Plaintiffs'' and "punitive damages,"
Plaintiffs' "Second Amended Complaint," pg. 7. The Court, in
its January 11, 2006 ruling, already ruled upon the Plaintiffs'
estoppel, fraud and waiver claims. Therefore, because those are
the only causes of action pled by the second amended complaint,
there remains nothing upon which the Court could base an award
of damages.
In their original complaint, the Plaintiffs did plead
breach of contract. However, as already noted, the later
amended pleadings superseded the original complaint. Because
the latest amended pleading did not include any action for
breach of contract, nor did it incorporate any reference to the
earlier complaints, that cause of action was deemed by this
Court to have been abandoned. Further, it would be incongruous
to grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment (which addressed all claims upon which an award of damages could be
based) and then award damages to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, by
granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court
had implicitly denied the Plaintiffs an award of damages, and,
for the sake of perfect clarity, explicitly denies Plaintiffs
request for damages at this time.
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B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
As the Court noted in its January 11, 2006 ruling, the REPC
was an enforceable agreement and satisfied the statute of
frauds. However, sometime in the middle of September 2004, the
parties abandoned that agreement. Neither party performed their
obligations under the REPC. Therefore, due to non-performance,
the parties waived their rights under that contract.
The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to specific
performance on this contract, invoking either equitable specific
performance or specific performance as outlined in the REPC*
The Court has already addressed both of these arguments in its
January 11, 2006 ruling, but will briefly re-visit the issue.
First, the REPC, which created a contractual right to specific
performance, was abandoned by the parties. Therefore, it cannot
serve as a basis upon which this Court can grant specific performance. Second, because neither of the parties performed under the REPC, neither are in a position to seek equitable remedies. Therefore, equitable specific performance is not an option. Finally, the Lease Option was never memorialized in writing as required by law. Therefore, it cannot be specifically
enforced. As this Court views the situation, there is no avenue
by which to grant specific performance in this case.
It is appropriate at this point to clarify a point made by
the Court in its January 11, 2006 ruling. In discussing specific performance, the Court stated, "...the parties are free to
sue each other for defaulting under the REPC..." Ruling, pg.
3. In making this statement, the Court was contemplating a
separate lawsuit for breach of contract. Indeed, as already
stated, the original complaint in this action included a claim
for breach of contract. That claim, again as already stated,
was not included in later amended pleadings, therefore it was
deemed by the Court to have been abandoned. The Plaintiffs have
indicated that *[t]his court recognized the issue in its judgment on the motions for summary judgment in stating this issue
was preserved for trial." See Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Reply Memorandum, filed February 14, 2006 pg.l. The
Plaintiffs misunderstand the Court's ruling. To be clear, the
breach action was not included in the second amended complaint.
Therefore, when the Court said the parties were free to sue each
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other for breach, that contemplated a separate action for breach
of contract. The Court did not, at any time, state that the issue was preserved for trial.
C. THE LIS PENDENS
The lis pendens is the primary subject of the Plaintiffs'
objections to the Defendants' proposed order which followed the
Courts' January 11, 2006 ruling. The Plaintiffs have pointed
out that the Court did not address the lis pendens in its January 11, 2006 ruling. The Court concedes this point and recognizes the need to rule upon this issue in order to conclude the
matter.
The Defendants have argued that the lis pendens constitutes
a wrongful lien. The Defendants argue that the lis pendens has
been wrongful from the date on which the Court made findings and
dissolved the TRO in this matter. The Court reminds the Defendants that at the hearing on November 29, 2004, the Court was
specifically addressing the case in light of the TRO which had
been entered. The Court was not addressing the merits of the
underlying causes of action at that time.
Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the lis pendens
has not, at any time in this matter, been wrongful. The fact of
the matter is that litigation has been pending during the entire
time that the lis pendens has been in place. The lis pendens
"charges the public with notice of outstanding claims and causes
one who deals with property involved in pending litigation to do
so at his peril." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d
1244 (Utah 1979) . The Court believes that the lis pendens has
been lawfully in place, notifying the public of pending litigation. Therefore, the Court will not order the removal of the
lis pendens. Similarly, the Court will not award the Defendants
any damages, costs or fees as they relate to the lis pendens.
The Court also reminds the parties that the lis pendens can
lawfully remain in place after this Court issues final judgment
in the matter, pending any forthcoming appeal. See Hidden Meadows, 590 P,2d at 1248.
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO APPEAL
Upon review of this motion, the Court is convinced that
this motion is unnecessary at this time, as a final judgment has
not yet issued. Even though the Court's January 11, 2006 ruling
was caption "Ruling and Order" and contained a paragraph titled
"Order," neither of the parties have treated that as a final
judgment. The Defendants' submitted a proposed order to the
Court, which, as of yet, the Court has not signed. Submitting
this proposed order to the Court indicates to the Court that the
Defendants did not view the Court's ruling as a final order in
the matter. Therefore, the Court finds that no final judgment
has entered and therefore the Plaintiffs' time to appeal has not
yet begun to expire. As a result, because this issue is not
ripe for decision, the Court will dismiss the motion.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AWARD FEES AND COSTS
As Defendants have correctly stated, attorney fees are only
awarded if permitted by statute or contract. No statute awards
attorney fees in a matter such as this, except for the portion
of this matter involving the TRO and the lis pendens. The Court
is of the opinion that the Defendants should be awarded the fees
incurred in defending against the TRO. As for the lis pendens,
fees are only recoverable in the event that the lis pendens was
wrongful. The Court has ruled that the lis pendens was not
wrongful, therefore there can be no recovery under that statute.
Having addressed the relevant statutes, the Court now turns
to the contract between the parties. The REPC specifically addresses attorney fees. While this was, at one time, an enforceable contract between these parties, that contract cannot serve
as a basis for the award of fees in this matter. The Court has
found that the parties abandoned the REPC and relinquished their
rights thereunder. Indeed, it is for this reason, in large
part, that the Court granted the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. It would be incongruous to say that the parties abandoned the REPC, but the Defendants can recover their fees under
that same contract.
Therefore, no attorney fees will be awarded to the Defendants other than those fees incurred as a result of the TRO.
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Because the Court finds that the REPC had been abandoned by both
parties sometime in September 2004, the provision of the REPC
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in the event of
litigation to enforce the REPC is no longer enforceable.
Finally, the Defendants, as the prevailing party in this
matter, will be awarded their costs of suit.
ORDER
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that Plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider is DENIED (noting that the Court finds no basis for
an award of damages or specific performance for the Plaintiffs);
that Plaintiffs' motion to extend time for appeal is DISMISSED
as not ripe for decision; that the Defendants' motion for fees
and costs is GRANTED IN PART, but only as to 1) the recovery of
attorney fees for the portion of this case involving the TRO and
2) an award of their costs of suit as the prevailing party; and
that the lis pendens is not wrongful and should not be removed
during the pendency of this litigation, including during any
pending appeal.
Dated this

/\P\

day of

^(jfsjA^

, 2006.

BY THE COOTfT: )

!N R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDR1DGE and MARTINA ELDRIDGE,
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs

Case No. 04080079
Judge John R. Anderson

JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH,
Defendants.

The above-captloned

matter

came

before

the Court,

pursuant

to

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on August 26,
2005. The Plaintiffs also liled a Cross Motion for Sumnary Judgment.
The parties submitted memoranda on the motions and the Court heard oral
argument on December 19, 2005. The Court then entered its Ruling and
Order on January

11, 2006. The Court's Ruling and Order

grants

the

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the Plaintiffs' Cross
Motion

for Summary

Judgement. The

n ""insidpr, and a motion
filed a motion

tn p*tend

for fees and costs

Plaintiff

then

filed

time to apppa],

whil^

The Court entered

Order on those motions on March 29, 2006

a motion

its

to

PP f -nd.j n t o
PJIL^Q

rind

Based on those Rulings and Orders and the findings and reasons set
forth therein, the Court hereby Orders that:
1.
to

be

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (which the Court allowed
filed

at

the

December

19,

2005

hearing)

is

dismissed

with

prej udice.
2.

Plaintiffs'

motion

seeking

additional

time

to

appeal

is

dismissed as it was filed prematurely.
3.

Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is denied.

4.

Defendants' Counterclaim alleging an unlawful lis pendens is

dismissed with prejudice.
5.

Defendants are awarded the fees incurred on that portion of

the case involving the TRO. Defendants are also awarded their costs. An
affidavit setting forth the fees incurred shall be filed with the Court
and the Plaintiffs shall have ten days from the mailing of the affidavit
to file an objection as

to the reasonableness of the fees. If there is

an objection the Court will hold a hearing on the reasonableness of the
fees .
DATE D this

fy

day of April, 2J306
BY THE,

District Judge

ADDENDUM F

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,
RULING
Plaintiffs,

vs.
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH,

CASE NO. 04 08C0079
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs'"Motion tc
Conform the Complaint to the Evidence," tiled with the Court on
March 14, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum and a
propose:) "Third Amended Complaint." The Defendants filed an opposition memorandum on March 24, 2006. The Plaintiffs filed a
response to the Defendants' opposition or. April 05, 2C06. On
that same day, the Court received a notice tc submit tne motion
for decision. Having reviewed the motion and related memoranda,
the Court now rules upon the motion.
The motion seeks for a court order amending (for a third
time) the Plaintiffs' complaint to include a multitude of issues
as identified by the motion, including; 1) specific performance;
2) damages; 3) attorney fees / costs; 4) breach of contract; 5)
fraud; 6) waiver; 7} promissory estoppel; 8) punitive damages;
9) covenant of good fai-h and fair dealing; and 10) intentional
/ negligent misrepresentation. Before addressing the merits of
the Plaintiffs' motion, the Court points out that previous rulings have already explicitly addressed each and every issue
identified by the Plaintiffs' motion, excepL for tne issues of

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and intentional /
negligent misrepresentation.
The Plaintiffs, in making their motion, rely on Sules 8(f)
and 15(c) of the Utan Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3(f)
states, V A11 pleadings shall be so construed as 10 do substantial justice." The Court recognizes that pleadings are to be
construed as to do substantial justice. However, in this case,
the issue is not construing a pleading (i.e., the second amended
complaint, as the operative pleading), but rather the issue is
whether to allow amendment to a pleading for a third tine, after
summary judgment for the opposing party heis issued, to include
new causes of action not included in previous pleadings, for
that reason, the Court finds that Rule 8(f) is inapposite to the
motion, before the C o u m ,
Unlike Rule 8(f), Rule 15(b) is arguably relevant to tne
motion before the Court. Rule 15(b) states,
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, tney shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such ame.ndner.ts of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend dees
not affect the result of the trial ot these issues.
If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by tho pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation
of the mer.its of the action will be subserved thereby and
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his act j on or defense upon the merits.
The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party tc meet such evidence*,
The Court finds that case law Interpreting Rule .1.5(b) as it pertains to lawsuits disposed of at the summary judgment phase is
scant. The plain reading of the rule suggests to this Court, as
has been held in other jurisdictions, that Rule 15(b) applies
only where the case has proceeded to actual trial, .5ej3 Crawfcrd
v. Gould, 56 F.lci 2162 (9th Cir. 1995); plue Cross Blue Shield
of Ala, v. Weitz, 913 £\2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990). The rule it2 of 5

self employs the words "tried" and "tne trial." The language of
the rule and the persuasive authority from other jurisdictions
lends credence to the proposition that Rule 15 ;b) is cr.ly implicated when the case proceeds LO trial. This motion would be
easily resolved in favor of the Defendants if the Court were to
find Rule 15(b) net applicable to cases decided on summary judgment. That said, the parties have identified Hall Strom v. 3uhjLer, 378 P.2d 355 {Utah 1963), which applies Rule 15(b) to a
case decided on summary judgment, but thai: esse does not explicitly address Rule 15{b)'s applicability to cases decided on summary judgment. fc'or purposes of this ruling, and against reservations to the contrary, the Court will assume that Rule 15(b)
does apply in cases decided on summary judgment, thus giving the
Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt. Even making such an assumption, the Court is not convinced that the rule requires the
Court to allow the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint' for a
third time.
Tne Court, finds chut ths Defendants havu repeatedly objected to Plaintiffs' submission of matters outside of the
pleadings for the Court's consideration. See Defendants' "Mem.
:.r, Opp. to Plaintiffs' Xotion to Reconsider," -at 11 (objecting
to covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Defendants' N'Repiy
Mom. in Supp. of Motion for Summary Judgment," at 7 (objecting
to misrepresentation); Defendants' "Reply Mem. in Supp. of Defendants' Motion to Award Fees and Costs," at 1 (objecting to
breach of contract). Having objected to the issues, the Court
capnct find that the issues were tried oy the express or implied
consent of the parties, and therefore the Court is not required
to allow amendment of the complaint. Rsthor, these issues, being specifically objected to, implicate the third sentence of
Rule 15(b). See fibre Trust, 1 nc. v. Brahman-fin., 974 P.2d
288, 291 (Utah 1999). Under that part of the rule, allowing the
Plaintiffs to amend the complaint is subject, to the discretion
of the trial court. The Court "may" allow the pleading to be
amended if: 1) presentation of the Terics of the action are
thereby subserved and 2) if the objecting party fails zo satisfy
the Court ~hat the admission of such evidence woulc bo prejudicial to the objecting party.
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In this case, the Court finds that neither requirement is
met. First, allowing the Plaintiff to amend "he complaint will
not facilitate presentation en the merits, which have already
been fully adjudicated at this late point by the entry of summary judgment in favor of Lhc: Defendants. Second, the Defendants: have satisfied the Court that prejudice would result if
the Court were to allow the Plaintiffs to amend, the complaint
for a third time and after summary juagrcent has entered.
The Plaintiffs have offered this Court no explanation as to
why thesa new claims were not included in the First Amended Complaint or in the Second Amended ComplainL. Twice the Plaintiffs
have amended their complaint (cnc;e by rignt and once by permission of the Court) and, having issued final judgment on the
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs now seek to shift to new theories hoping that one such theory will ioac the Court to find in
their favor. In the opinion of this Court, that is not the purpose of any of the rules reliec upon by the Plaintiffs in their
motion tc conform. The parties have prepared the case, including conducting discovery and arguing motions, based upon the
first anc second amended complaints. At this late time in the
case, it would be clearly prejudicial to the Defendants to allow
the Plaintiffs once again to amend their complaint. The Defendants have not prepared theli case with these new causes of action in mind, but have uiiigently objected to tne introduction
of issues outside of the pleadings. To allow t.ne Plaintiffs to
continually refine their strategy, both after summary judgment
motions were filed ans after judgment was entered on such motions, would work an injustice on. the Defencants, Therefore,
the Court will deny the Plaintiffs' motion to conform.
Finally, having addressed the only two new causes of action
contained in the proposed third amended complaint, the Court
wishes to once again briefly address r.he issue of breach of contract, In the January 11, 2006 ruling, this Court, in discussing specific psrformar.ee, stated that "While the parties are
free to sue each ether for defaulting under the REPC, seeking
specific performance (an equitable remedy) requires *ciean
hands,' which, due to non-performance, neither of the parties
possesses under the REPC." January 11, 2006 Ruling, at pg. 3.
?he Plaintiffs understood this to mean that the issue of breach
A C f '.;

of concract was reserved for trial. To clarify Che Court's position or: thxs issue, the Court, in the Maich 29, 2006 ruling,
stated that "In making [the statement aoove], the Court was contemplating a separate lawsuit Cor breacn of cortract" because
thp Court believed chat the Plaintiffs, by not including the
original breacn of contract claim in either of the amended C O T piamts, had abandoned that particular cause of action. Upon
further reflection, this Court is of the opinion that a separate
lawsuit on breach of contract would be unavailing to either
party for, in large part, the vcr.y reason that th~s Court
cranted the Defendants' motion for summary 'judgment. The Court
has found that the parties abandoned Lho 35 PC sometime .in September ?C04 and tnat both parties waived the rigrts that were
enforceable by vrtue of that agreement. Therefore, the Court
was wrong when it stated that the parties were free to sue each
other for defaulting under the REPC. That agreement, abandoned
by both parties, became unenforceable and neither party can pursue an action for breach of that contract.
Tnerefore, based upon the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' "Motion to Conform che Complaint to the Evidence" is DENiSD.
Dated this

/<T

day of

THfiMs

/ 2006.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA
ELDRIDGE,
RULING A N D

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs .
JAMES L. F A R N S W O R T H ; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH,

CASE N O . 040800079
JUDGE JOHN R. A N D E R S O N

Defendants.

This m a t t e r is before the Court on Defendants' "Motion to
Release Lis P e n d e n s , " filed April 2 5 , 2006, and accompanied by
supporting m e m o r a n d u m .
The Plaintiffs filed an objection to the
motion on May 0 4 , 2006.
The Defendants' reply memorandum in
support was filed May 12, 2006.
On July 18, 2006, the Court r e ceived a notice to submit the motion for d e c i s i o n .
The Court
has reviewed the m o t i o n , the related m e m o r a n d a , and the prior
rulings in this c a s e , and, having received a request for d e c i sion, now rules upon the motion.
For the reasons that follow,
the Court will grant the motion in part.
The Defendants argue that the lis pendens should be r e leased pursuant to Utah Code A n n . § 78-4 0 - 2 . 5 ( 3 ) , which r e a d s :
(3) A court shall order a notice released if: (a) the court
receives a motion to release under Subsection (2) ; and (b)
the court finds that the claimant has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the
real property claim that is the subject of the notice.
The Court first notes that while it has addressed the lis p e n dens in other rulings related to this case, this is the first
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time a motion for release has been filed. The Court has ruled
that the lis pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien and has
cited to Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1979) to support the proposition that the lis pendens could stay
in place pending the Plaintiffs' appeal. See "Ruling and Order," p. 6 (filed March 29, 2006).
In the March 29 ruling, the
Court stated that "the Court will not order removal of the lis
pendens." I_d. The Court further ordered that "the lis pendens
is not wrongful and should not be removed during the pendency of
this litigation, including during any pending appeal." id. at
8. In taking that position on the issue of the lis pendens, the
Court was considering it in the context of finding the lis pendens to not be wrongful. In other words, the Court's refusal to
order the release of the lis pendens was due to the Court's
finding that the lis pendens was not wrongful and could therefore lawfully remain in place.
The Defendants' motion to release presents the Court with a
new issue to consider. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-40-2.5(3), it would appear that the Court has no choice but
to release the lis pendens at this time. The statute requires
(1) a motion to be filed and (2) a finding by the Court that the
"claimant" (as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. §
78-40-2.5(1) (a)) has not established the probable validity of
the underlying real property claim. Both of these criteria are
met at this time. The Defendants have filed a motion, satisfying the first requirement. Furthermore, the Court has granted
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, indicating that the
Plaintiffs' have failed to establish probability of validity of
the underlying property claim by a preponderance of the evidence, satisfying the second requirement.
The Plaintiffs argue that, should the Court decide to leave
the lis pendens in place, the Court may require a "guarantee"
(as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. §
78-40-2.5(1)(b)) as a condition of maintaining the notice. As
the Court reads the statute, and as previously stated, the Court
does not have a choice as to whether to leave the lis pendens in
place once the requirements of § 78-40-2.5(3) are met. The
Court does not construe the statute to allow the Court to ignore
the mandatory "shall" language of § 78-40-2.5(3) by requiring a
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guarantee under § 78-40-2.5(5). Rather, the Court interprets
the plain language of the statute to indicate that a guarantee
is always an option when a notice of lis pendens is in place,
whether or not a motion to release the notice has been filed.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5(5)(b). The fact that the Court,
in its discretion, may order a guarantee as a condition of maintaining the notice does not give the Court latitude to ignore
clear direction from the Utah Legislature. "Shall" is mandatory, and the Court will abide by the requirements of the law as
outlined in § 78-40-2.5(3). It is for this reason that the
Court will grant the Defendants' motion to release.
In addition to the motion to release, the Defendants have
also requested costs and attorney fees as they relate to this
motion, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5(7). That statute
requires the Court to award such costs and fees "unless the
court finds that: (a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification;...." In this case, the Court finds that
the Plaintiffs, in filing the lis pendens, acted with substantial justification. At the time the lis pendens was filed, the
Plaintiffs honestly believed that they had rights to the underlying property based upon theories of contract and estoppel.
The Court does not believe that the Plaintiffs filed suit merely
to harass or unjustifiably cloud title to the property. The
fact that the Plaintiffs' claims have ultimately been adjudicated by this Court as non-meritorious in no way diminishes the
substantial justification the Plaintiffs had when filing the notice of lis pendens. The Court will therefore not award costs
or fees, as they relate to this motion, to the Defendants.
//

//

//
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ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
the Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART: 1) the notice of lis
pendens is ordered to be released forthwith and 2) the Defendants request for costs and fees on the motion is DENIED.
Dated this

\(r

day of

ftuCiUSf

2006.

BY THE COURT:

JOHN R. ANDE
By.
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ADDENDUM H

DIS-,' "" :OURT
DUCHE:-,,
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IN T H E EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN A N D FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TY E L D R I D G E and M A R I N A
ELDRIDGE,
RULING a n d ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs .
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH,

CASE NO. 040800079
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This m a t t e r is b e f o r e the Court on the following m o t i o n s :
1) Plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Appeal, filed July 2 8 ,
2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum; and (2) Plaintiffs' M o t i o n ' f o r Stay of Execution of the Court's Orders and
for A p p r o v a l of the Bond, filed August 2 3 , 2006, and accompanied
by supporting memorandum.
The Defendants did not respond to the
Motion to File an Amended A p p e a l , and the Plaintiffs submitted a
notice to submit on August 2 3 , 2 0 0 6 . : The Defendants filed a
memorandum in opposition to the motion to stay on September 01,
2006. The Plaintiffs' reply memorandum in-support was filed
September 20, 2006. The Court received a notice to submit the
motion to stay on September 26, 2006. Having reviewed the motions and related memoranda, and having received a notice to
submit each motion for decision, the Court now rules upon the
motions.
I. MOTION TO FILE AMENDED APPEAL:

1

The Court was not made aware that this motion was still pending until recently. The Court apologizes for Lhe delay in ru.l \ ng upon this motion.
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The Court's review of the law does not indicate that any
such motion exists. Further, even assuming such a motion is appropriate, this is not the correct Court to which to address the
motion. Jurisdiction over any appeal in this matter is properly
vested in the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals.
This Court lacks the authority to determine what issues will be
entertained by the appellate court on appeal. Therefore, the
Court will dismiss the motjon.
II. MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF THE COURT'S ORDERS AND E'OR
APPROVAL OF THE BOND:
Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in
part,
When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay
is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The
bond may be given at or after the time of filing the
notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(d).
can be

The form of the supersedeas bond

a personal bond having one or more sureties who are
residents of Utah having a collective net worth of at
least twice the amount of the bond, exclusive of property exempt from execution. Sureties on personal bonds
shall make and file an affidavit setting forth in reasonable detail the assets and liabilities of the
surety.
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(i)(l).

Further,

[a] supersedeas bond given pursuant to Subdivision (d)
shall provide that each surety submits to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the
clerk of the court as the surety's agent upon whom any
papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond
may be served, and that the surety's liability may be
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enforced on motion and upon such notice as the court
may require without the necessity of an independent
action.
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(i)(4). The Court, having reviewed the
matter, finds that these requirements are met. The Plaintiffs
have obtained a sufficient personal bond from Utah residents who
have filed an affidavit setting forth reasonable detail as to
their assets and liabilities. Further, the sureties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. While the Court can
understand the Defendants' desire to have greater documentation
of the assets and liabilities of the sureties, the requirements
of the rule have been met. Therefore, the Court will approve
the bond. Pursuant to Rule 62(d), r.he stay is now in effect; ana
will encompass all orders of this Court, including the release
of the lis pendens, which the Defendants did not object to.
ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the motion to amended is DISMISSED and the motion for stay
and approval of the bond is GRANTED. The Court further orders
the sureties in this matter, consistent with their affidavit, to
take no action to lessen or deplete their assets during the pendency of the appeal. Af f. David and Yvonne Kennison, 54.
Dated this

f<T

day of

^ ^ ^
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, 2006.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 040800079 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

CLARK B ALLRED
ATTORNEY DEF
363 E MAIN ST STE 201
VERNAL, UT 84078
ALVIN R LUNDGREN
ATTORNEY PLA
5015 W OLD HWY STE 200
MT GREEN UT 84050

Mail

Dated this

ML

da

v °f

MQIUJIHW"

, 2o_d£.

Page 1 ( l a s t )

ADDENDUM I

FHX

n:

WD.

HUQ. 26 2904 11:42*1 Pi

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
•Husfata I n U y binding contn*i_ Utah \xm nxjuin* ma! astrfs lic#io«*s to <eo *** form. Buy** and S«ilar, howwy-K, way sg#e* tu aH* or dmleto
toprPtbk>«»crtou»#4dMfVM<foiiiL 3/ou dmmWtp. &• wadtice. cDnatjli|our«lcniey orUx*wi«K
x

..

r . EARN55T

*ON£r PJECaPT

_

s :c puroase the Property
in
?ne w m of
described b e k y a t e raefcy <fe«*iv9rs to tne ercken&fe as Carney Mcney.toeancunc cf 5 J ^°L^2 0 ~~
vtfiich. jpcn Acceptance of this crTei by at! parties ias defined in Secton 23).
-dance whh stale law . < ^ * & I be depcsitejjn;
Received by" _
3 naixire

at Agent/Broker acknowledge* receipt of Earnest Money)
Friend M^rrjo^i

^

BroKerage:

9/*

r- ^JJO'ovuY-.^ltl

OFFER TC3^PURCHASE
^ PURCHASEfi
ll-OS

\

,

•

Q, -

„so«**cnnea-T U 1 H * M ^ F
V^TSP frVsvVU
Ccur.tycf V3w>V^ *•* V^-t.
Slate cf Lssft Zip^'-WO /tr.e"Property*).
ao\cnw.
Ciryof
1.1 Included Items. Unless exc!ucte<1 rarer., riirs sa:e indudei tfi* fsHcrvwinc ^ n stfpresently atTacred tc the Property:
plumbing, heating, aif ccriritfcnng Sx&tf» etc equipment ceUsre ^r.s *si2--^E?ert &j»,t-m spc*rarce$:tontfixturessr.2
bulbs; bathroom futures; curtains, draperies snd ;*ccs; ^raftr* and doer screens: storrr. deers arcf wif!dcvfs: vwdew 3»nds;
awnings; insistedtelevisionsnteTra; sate^ne dishes and sys£tf. perrr-jn^y slfcxs£ ^ T i ^ : auxrnstcca'ace door opnr«er
and ofxcmpanjring trsnsniitte.-'s); fenc^g; arc tr^ss and scrubs. The fefcewinc items shs!i also 5s r.ciLdted "r. this sale 2nd
conveyed under separate Bill cf Sale with warranties as :c
fcfc:
.
AJ2 Cxciuded iiatns. T h e f c ^ i ^ H e ^ s are -xciuded frcys this *ae £ > ^ ^ ^&<>i*VjrL*V^ A 3 ^ F g ~ ^ T
\Z Water Rights. Tj)efoi^Jwir^gwsierng.^*saremeiv-decin!Msz^ ^">-° <-^-^^^« ^ \ J W A W C lak^k" A - ^
PVM g r ^ K ^ ->
(HQ gXA-)
1 _
'
1.4 Survey. {CJieck appfccafcle boxes)* A survey [ \ WJLL J^VWIUL NOT be prepared by s licensee 5Lrveycr. The
Survey WorK vr?U be: [ J Prcper!y corners sfcsked \ ) Boundary* Survey [ ] Boii^cary & Imorovements survey [ j Other
(specify)
. Reiponsfcifeyforpaymer.t'[ ] Buyer [ } Se3er [ ] =L»yer snd Sefler share equaHy. Buyers
Dbli^aticn tc parchaw und^r thi^ Contract [ ] IS [ ] is NOT czftfXcn&d uccn Buyer's aporcva-' uf ihe 5ur.*y Wcrh. if yes
the terms of the attached Sorvey Addendum apply.

£ y

2. PURCHASE PWCE- The pL^hase Pricefcrtite Prcpery is S J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H
2.1 Method of Payment Trie Purchase Pnce will be paia as foUows.

sl^w
s ^ ^ ^ d o '

(?) Esrnest Mornjy Deposit Under certain csnditscn** described tti >Jiis Contract, THF5
DEP05.T i*AY BECOME TOTALLY NOH-REFUNDABLE.
(t) NewLo^::. 3^yer sjp?es-o appv f"ra«r-A:£«.-: « ; . ^ -*.Cr-i> Sec^c-rlS. 3uyerwincpphf'cr
one or more o? tnc- fo?»owir*g [cans, r ] COKVENTIONAL [ ] rrlA [ ] VA
Jt^OTHER ispecfy} C^r*^PoT^yO A L
]
If an fYirJVA lean applies, set actactvad FKAA/A L csri Addendum.
If the ten istoiremeje any particular remis. then cne^K be-low anc g.ve cecals'
f J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
(c) Loan Assumption (s*e attacne^ -«.^.T.ptjc^ ACc-andLm if sccic2tAe\
(cO Seller r rnsneinrx ^>ee attached SefUrr ^-.nanrzr-g Adceccurr. .f appiicaoie;
(e) Other {specify)
(!) Balance of Purchase FrtCe in Cash at Settlement
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PURCHASE FRiCtL Total of iinco (a) through (0
/ /
Strlle^s I m t i a i ^ ^ y ^
Date - / - ^ /^tjr_
Date'"'
T"
c

T
l=oai» 4r:i3 - R#at F^f.me -°ur=lc»«^ C^>f»trjo>. - G**nUPiioLi.-ig. !r.c. n. . 3(h-i773€2i

tiuycr's Iniuals

/7^
Date

FRjM :

FtM MD. :

Hu ? . 2b 2084 li:<J2£rl

P2

2J2 financing Condition, (check applicable box)
(a) M Buyers oWigsticn to fcurcfa** Te Prcparry IS conditioned uocn B^yef qualifying for .he applicable loanfs}
referenced in SedJon 2.1(b» Cr (c) (the "Lo^n*} This ccp^u^nfe*referred tc as the Tmarcing Cond.bcn."
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation ts purchj«
Section 2.3
does not apply.
2-3 Application for Loan.
(a) Bayer's duties. No later than the Applicator. Deadline referencec m Secuor. 24{a). Buyer shall appiy fcr the
Loan. "Loan Application* occurs only when Buyer has: «i) completed. &Qncdz and delivered to the lender (the
"Lander) the amialteanapplication and documentation required by the Larder; a* ic (n) paid all Joan application fees
as required cy the Lender Buyer agrtes tc dSgertty wonX tc obfatn the Lee:;. Buyerwi! promptly prcvice me Lender
with anv additions) documentation as required by the Lencer.
fb) Procedure if Loan Application is denied. JfSuver r e c c e s wr.ru^r^fra^
not approve the Lean {a 'Loan Denial*), Buyer snail, no iater than 2ir*e c a t e n a deys thefeaSer, provide a copy to
Seller. Buysr cr Seilar may, wfchin three csier-da.- days af»r Seae^s nfCE;pi c; sjcr. notice, cancel this Ccntrect by
provkSrswridenno6ce to the other oarty. in:teeventofacanc4p3L'r>ni^^
{IJrftha Loan Denial
was received by Buyer on cr before the ^ M
dsv of S+-s&.
, : X C T ^ 7 the Earnest Money Deposit shall
,
be returned to Buyer (a) if the Lean Denial was received by Bfcyersrter btet date. 3uyer agrees *cforfeit,and SeQer
acress tc acceot as Seller's exc&sive remedy, the Earr.es: Monsy z* [[c'jidzt&d damages. A failure to cancel as
provided in rhisSection 2.2/b) shaS have no effect on the ^na* tcirg Oz*\ctior. « * fcth n Sscocn 2-2(aK Cancellation
pursuant to the previsions cf'any other section at this Ccn^act s.i^fi be governed Sy suchtft*etprovisions.
1A AppraisaJ ofProperty. Buyers obligation to purchase ;h~ Property *ft \§J£& NOT conditioned u'pen the Property
spcraising fcr not less than the Purchase Prtce. It the apcraisa? ccrscitjcr. appaesanc; ihe Prcpeny ^praises for less than
the Purchase Price, Buyer may cancel this Contract ay providing wniten recce to Seller no later thsn three calendar days
attar Buyer's receipt of nctics of the appraised vaiue. In the event oi such cancelation, t^-e Earnest Money Cepcsn shall
b* released to Buyar. A faikim to cancel as proviced \t\ this Section 2.4 s^afl ce r^errec a waiver cf the appraisal
condition by Buyer.
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Sefci€!T>ent shcil take place en The Se£err.entDeadline rafarer.ct9d n Sscfcn 24{d), cr
on a dgfre upen which Buyer and Seller agree in w-ntxng.teSerJJe^ie:'rsr3il ccciir enly wher. ail of be rcBcwir.g have been
completed: (a) Buyer and Setter have signed snc dallvarBd to each other cr *o the sscrow/desing office 31 documents
required by this Contract by the Lender, by wn£en escrow Instructors or ty
by Buyer under these documents (except lor the proceeds cf a^y new loan) have been de-r^ersd by Buyer tc Seller or to the
escrow/tlcsing office in the form, of collected or deared tunds: and (c) any monlaE reoi^rad to be paid by Seller under tnese
documents bSN^ baen defivered by Seller to Buyer cr to the escrovw/ciosins oTtce in the form of cotlecad cr dearec lcr.cz.
Seta* and Buyer shall each pay crre-telf {M) cf the fee charged cv the escrc^/ebsbg office kx its services in the
sentemerrtfcfcsing process. Taxes and assessment fix ±e curapt y^ar, rer-> s: anc inerestCTIassumed cbigarjens snail be
prorated at Settlement as set forth in tn?s Ssct-jn Ts^ant depcerts^incfuding, btr. net iimited to. secinty deposits, desrmg
deposits and prepaid rents) shal be paid or cratWed by Scderto Buyer ar Setfemer.L Proraticns s s forth in this SecSon sfrztL
be made as of the Setaernent Dea&ne cais rWerenced :n Sacticr* 2^<d)^nJ«ss cth^rAise agreed to :n writlns by the partJes.
Such-^htingcouldincsadethesettementst^ienient Tr»etiBrwactionvfciTl^(^i3ioer2Gc^^
compteted. and when aA of thefcflowina;have been cempteted: (i) tne orcceecb of any new loan have been defcvered by the
Lander to Setter or "to the escrcwfcfcsinc office; and (5) the appficafcie Ctosmg documents r^ve been recorded in tr.e otTdce
of the co«jn^ nscorder. The aliens descihsd ?n pgrta (?) ^^ ^ c f rr^ ^rerj&dT»3 ser.tsnce shall be cornoleted v*Tthin fcur
calendar days of Settlement
cv-f->
4. POSSESSION. Se»lar£r^fcelNerp^.ysic^!pc^sAssk;n;cBv.^ w i n r : f ] J
C ] Other (specify) _,

hours [ ] f l W / c after Closinq-

'

^~

^

5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At m^ sjgning or ;hi3 Contract
[

] Setter's Initials

The Ustinc Agent,
-r- \> •A
*
Tne Selung Agent
The Listing Broker.
T ^ ^ . i : ^ R^L,.,.
Toe Se:l.nc B.ckcr

\
^

] Buyer's mitwts

\^S
\ ^ l OCX
> X W$ ^
\ \

\ \ M

\ V \ Y\.
A ^ 4 i i

'Stress

[ ] Seller [ I B ^ r [ J both Buysr *nd Seller
as a Limiled Agent;
repifes,-^ [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer r ] both Buyer and Seller
„

^r € s^n!s [ ] Sa!Jer [ } Buyer [ ] b < ^ B u ^ S d ^ l t e r
tews**:*

» a limited Agent;
{ J SeJIer £ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer zndSeller
as a Limited Agent
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Seller's ^ i t » ^ i ^ O _ Date JWIOH

Buyer's \mnMsjg£'

Cste & / ^ 7 ^ f

frcGM :

tti

HQ. :

fin*.
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S T1TUE INSURANCE. At Sette-nert. Scaler agrees * pay for a ^ r ^ r ^ v e r a c e cwnef s pchcy of WJe insurant insunnc
3uyer in the amount of the Purchase Price.
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. Ho l a w than ft, GeGer D « ' ^ ^ ! ^ ; ^ t ^ 2 r f : 2 ? " ^
* * " * * "****
(a> a Seller p i o ^ condition, dsciosufe fcr the Prop^y, signed and dated cy Sttter,
(b) a commitmen: for the policy of ride insurance;
}c( a oODY of any teases affecting the Prop*rr/ no; exp«nns prx* to closing
(d) writer, notice of any claims and/cr c o r d o n s knewr to Seller reJ3t.no ic c*wiror.mental problems a-TC cuilomg cr
zon.r.g code violate**: and
(e) Other Wpedfy) _ J U £ t

8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CAMCEL BASED OM EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Bjyer* oolicsiicn to purcr.ase under
^ t h i s Contract (check applicable boxes):
, , - * , c - l a r - : * ^ , ^ ^ ™ « H r Q-,-nr •»•
rOQ
IS fatfS NOT conditioned : ^ o n g o e r ' s approval o* ihe centers uf £;; r«a SsJar ^scfcsures rsffcienced m S^CDOT. ,
J * & 3 IS B t S NOT GoreBtonea uccn Bi.--*f s accnr.ai cf a phy s-cai ccr.d:i-cn :rspecr»cn of »he ^rcps*/;
1 $ r [ l J S C T ^ N O T congitjonec 14500 Buyer's e>provai of trie fcilcwng u&± *c eva.uaaer.s cf ihs Prcpery {soec-fy)

[Buyer's
under Seclicn 11.
3.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. Ks User mart tne Evakjausrvs & Snsoaczcns Deadline re?ere*v^*i in Sectcn
24{c)*2uyef shall: ;a) complete slf Evaiuaiicn* & inspectors; and {b> aeaermine if i r e Evaluations & inspections are
acceptable to Buyer.
3 J> Right t o Cancel or Object !f Buyer determines that the Evaluations & nspecaens are unacceptable. Buyer nay,
no !ater thart the Evaluations & Inspections Cesdfce, eethe-:. (a) cancai this Ccntrac: &y providing wntten nebee to Setier.
whereupon the Earnest Money Decosfc snail be released tc Buyer, or (b) provice Seller with wrfcsn notice of cbjecisrs.
6 3 Failure to Respond. If by the esp'rason cf tne Evs.ua(.tcna & tnspecticns Desdtaa, 8uyer dc.e± iict (a) cancel this
Contract as provided in Secticr 8^2: or (b) deliver a wr.tten cftscScr. to Seller regarding the Evaica&ons & Irioecscns. u*.e
Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer.
6 4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objection* *c Seiier, Buyer and Setter shall have seven calendar davs
after Setter4* reedpt of Buyer's oisechons (trie "Response PerkxT; !n wntgSjc "agree in w t m g uocn the manner cf resohr.ng
Buyer's obr^cSons. Sefler may, but 3rtcil not be required to, ^esdve Buye^s^3h|ecdcns. If Bi^er and Seder have not screed
to writing Upon the manner of rest^v^Biryer'Sotgections. 3-jyermsy caiiC^: this Chirac! by provicing r.titten nobce tn S^ler
no teter than thrae calendar ciays after expiration cf the P.esponba Pa-8co: jvrs-5i:pcn tna Sacrist Money Deposi shall be
releasedfc>Euyer. If this Contract m net canceled by Buyer ur^e: 'h** SCCLO-;. 5. ^, Severs oDjeeoons shaS be deemed wavecf
by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those fiems warranted in Seeder. 10.
9. ADOmONAL TERMS. Trm^ [ J ARE V ARE NOT addenda to ih& Contract coniain:ng accRionai tenrs. !f there are.
h e terms of ifse fdfowing addenda are irtcorporsted into this CcrtBct by t^:s refercrcc: [ ] Addendum No.
'
J Survey Addendum [ ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHAAfA Loan Addendum £ 1 Assumption Addendum
J Laad-Gased Paint AAJendum (in some transactions this addendum 13 required by taw\
1 Other (specify)
"
O. SEULER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS.
10,1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Setter nss tea Me to tne = ropert/ and wi) cenvev gcoo and marketable
3e tc Buyer at Casing by general warrant/ deed, unless the sale is being .-rsae pgreuant ts a re^ estate contract vwhicn
^ovides for tite to pass at a later sate. In that case, title will ce conveyee !:: acccrd3r.ee with the prevrsiens of snat contrac
uyer agrees, howverver. to accepttftle to the Property subject to the foile w.nc matter* cf :eco! z: essemspts. deed restnetbrs
ZZ&s {HTeaning ccvensnts. ccnd:t«cns and restn^cris). zr£ -cris-of-v.a/ ?.-.- sL-b;»c: :c the c ^ r t ^ t * D* the (>rnrVr:--^

r
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Seller*s t n i t f a J S a ^ C / -

Date7

f
2

y^

Bayer's Inrfab ^

^

^

pate

&/^7'<*i

FAX NC. :

ftu9.
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>r Title Insurance as
ffeofcr^-the Property
ssoaauon dues, utilities, and other s e r v e r prcvidea
« i - n e d DV Buyer u n d ~ Section 2.1.C). Seller will csi<se 10 be paid cff by Closing a»i mortgages, rust deeds judgmenis.
M a n s e ' s S e n * , tax tens and warrant. Seter *^> ca J S * » be paw ^nrer.t by dosing a!! assessments and humetxvriers
association dues.
1C.2 Condition of Property. Seder warrants thai >^e Psc-perty *-;i be .:!.KX>Q^wfr^cjrclDc.-. ON THE OATE SELLER
>eUV3RS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO B U Y « :
(a) the Prcoeny snail be crcom-dean and *ree & cebns a--.d c a r i n a c ^ n ^ n c s . Any Sei.er or lenari mo^ng-related
damage to the Property shall be ropar^d at Seters expense;
(b) the nesting, cooing e l e c t e d , plumbing and sDrinider systems and fixtures, and the a?p.>r.nce* ard fireplaces wi!l
bo in working order and fit fcr tneir intended purposes:
(c) the rocf and foundation s t e l be free of iesxs knovvr. to Setter.
(d) any private w«8 or sepfic tank servErs the Property 3**s» rave ^ p i ^ x i e permits and snail be 75 *.-crkinc order sne
fit for its intended punposa; snd
..
(e) the Property and improvements, i-^ciudir-s :n<s iandscapirc, *•$ - e in ZPS ST.TS jtrjeca* ccr.c\zzrt as .-.-ey wars on the
date of Acceptance.
t 1 . WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before SertJeTient. *uyer may. iipcn reasenstte notice and a%. a reasonable time,
scndiict a ^jvatio-Jhrougrf inspecben of the P-operty to determine onry th2t the Property is ~as represented," meaning tnstthe
items referenced in Sections 1 . : , 8.4 ana 10.2 ftr.a terns") are respectively present, rer^ired/chaarigec es agreed, and in the
a/arranted condftiorv. tf the tetms are net 33 represerrteo. Seller * m . D.TOT to Statement, replace, ccrrec: cr repair the ixms
cr. with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if appacaole). escrow 2n amount at Sedscmsni xo arcvid* *?r (he same. The failure
tc 'conduct a walk-through inspection, or tc claim that an iter; is nci =s r^presenf^d. shaii rot consu-ute a vwaivef by Buyer of
the right to receive, on the cate of possession, the items as 'epreserttetf
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seler agrees that from the date of Acceptance unm the dale cf Closing none of
the foflcwlng shall occur wShcut the prior written consent of Buyer: {£} nc changes in any existing Jesses shafl be made; (b J
no new leases sr&H be anterao into: (c) no SJbstsntial attars^ens cr improvement to the Property siiaii be made or
undettaken; end (d) no further financial encumbrancer to the Property Shan Se made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. rfBuyerGrSe!lertsacorporaticn.par:::a.^hi^trJ5: esisi-. Smited itabsTy ccmcany. orcthef
enfity. the person executing this Contract on rts oehaif wsrrar,:s l i s zf hei a^rncnr/ :o z~ so and x b-r.d fit-yer and Sefler.
14- COSiPLETE CONTRACT, Tnis Contrac: tocetr.er wit?-i its addenda, any attacned exhibits anc Seller Disdo&u-'iS
constitutBs the entire Contract be*areen the part»« and supersedes and reciaces any sne all phcr negotstions.
reprettintabons. warranties, understandings cr miL«ach» between the parties. This Contract cenr.a :e charged except cv
written agreement of the parties.
15. DfSPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any disc Jkz. 4i:scyg p-jor to cr ^fre? Closing relafed cc t t e Contract
[ ] SHALL p<l WAY (upon mutuai agreement of the parties} ftrsi oo S L ^ - n ^ c ^ mediajcr- If She cartes agree tc meciaiicn,
the dispute shaU be s^mftted to mediation through a mexfianon pro*/tder r:t;rus/ry agreed uccr. bv n e parties. Eac± carry
agrees to bear its own costs of roetfaSor.. if mactasonfeifcs,rhe otner p.-ccec^res snd refrteciies avai«3b»e under ihis Contract
snail apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shafl jrcnjta any -sfty from seeicing efrrrfgency eouitabie r^.&f poncing rnediaiion.
16. DEFAULT, fi Buyer defeufcs. Sefler r^ay elact erther to retain the Earrwis; Money Deceit as rtqufcatad darrages. or tc
return it and sue Buyer t3 specifcafly enferc^ this Contract c pursi.e cfoer -err.-ecses aveJabSa a! iaw. tl Sc5er dafauits, in
addition to raTwi-m of !he Earnest Money Cescsit Buyer, msv etect eimer tc zuctx tor: Setie- a smn equa to ^ e Earnest
Money Deposit as iwuicated {^rnaces. or may sue SeUer to SLeof C3^y err.-rcs? ?r.is Corrtraa c< puTsiie ct^er remedies
ava2able at iav/_ !f Buyerfeifecisto accept ;iqx>:ic!ad damages. Seiier agrees :c pay £ e -l^iiKsated r'^rrege? to Buyer upon
demand. !t is agreed that denial cf a Losr. App-icatcn made by tr^ Buyer is r.z i a default 2rvi is coverrteo'py Seccon 2 3{ b 1
17. ATTORNEY F H S AND COSTS. \n the aven: cf litgatior; or blrc'iac sm;ri^t»cT o enforce- this COTTSCL he pres-aihn^
party shall be eritted to costs and reascr-aSis sttcmey fees. However, hux -ay fees ^ja«! r o ! oe awvarceo rcr p^nuiipa^cr.
•n mediation under Section 15.
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18 NOTICES Except as prwided ir- Secrai 23. a.! notices requires under tn»s Contract mus; oe: (aj «r writing, (b) signed
by "the party giviog notice: and (c) received by the otter parry or me cthe- psrtys agem no later tear. tht applicable ctele
referenced irt this Cornrsct
19. ABROGATION, Except forihe p-X^sicr* n: Sections iC 1 ; 3.2 15 r.?:d " ^ and ^xpreis warranties made »n tr.is Contract
the provisions of !his Contract snaJ nc* spciy after CJc2»n%;.
20 RISK OF LOSS. All nsH of teas to the Property, incicctng onyskai carnage or cestrucacn »o the Property or its
improvements duetoany cause except ordinary wear and VSB: =*nd loss causec by a taking m err*ner.:cortiaint shall be bem*
by Sailer until the transaction is olosecL
21 TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Tirre ^s of tne esser.ee reoardinc the dates set "orth m this Contract. Extensions must be
acresd to tn writing by a» partes. Ur.iess othe-'wise exdkrth'siatec :n sWi Contract: {a}£erasrrr.2r.ce under each Secton of
trts Ccnlisd which referwxKS 2 date snai: absduae*/ be renuirea by 5 CG P.U iVourlain i >m* on the sirred slate: and (b) the
term "dsvsr $nafl rnasr. catendsr daysanc: shall be cx,n;eG beginmr; c~» the da-/fcftowingthe s*er*t wrucr. tnegers the t>m«rg
requirement (i.2., Accepfcanca, racacol of tne Selter Disclosures. a!c.:. Per?cr7T!3r.ce daces and Sfres referenced herem shall
net be bincing upon title ccrnoanies! lenders, appraisers and 3\h*xs not pzrtes, ID ths Cor^rac^ except as otnerwise agreed
to in wnbng by such non-party.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. FscsLTtte ^rax) transmission of a signed ccpy of ;hts Contract, any
acdenza ana ^cunteroffers, and :ha renarsrr^sic-'- ct any >$rec fax s^aii be the same as deliver? of ar cnoinal. This
Contract and any sddeflda arid counteroffers insy be ejsesfiea.- count*, parts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance * occurs when Sei ~r c r Suyer. respc nci~c to an otter or c^rtf eroner of trie other, ia> signs
$\e offer or counteroffer where noted 50 indcare accepterce; ana (b) communicates tc trie ctner psrty cr to the ctner party's
agent that the offer or counteroffer has been sigred as required.
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and 5e*er a$:ze thai Ihe following ceadf »nes <naii apply x this Contract
(a) Application Deadline

3

»^a&

(b> Seller Disclosure Deadline

^» A W " « »

* * t "*~Q^

(c) EyaluatktfK^lxispecfionsDeadUne

^ ^ y t * »

^ 4

(d) SattkmMtit Deadline

vJC<T

u

1 .X O O ^

( 5a t e)

\

(Date)

X.Qi>^ ( p ^

^M ^X o O ^

(patel

25. OFFER AND TlliE FOR ACCEPTANCE, ouyef offers to puicnas^»ha Pi jpecy c r ^ e abrwe terns anc cC"x2»*Jons. If
Seller does not accept thb offer b>: M k ^ ^ I ] AM T^JsPM Mountain Tifne po' ^ N^M^-yGase^ tn s effar ^nai? lapst'
^ d the Brokerage sha« nstum »ie Earnest Money Deposit to Biryer

Euy/rsSisraO-rs)

/

,0(ier Da-el

.gjfrgjl^bmffi

' ' , V J Jo*!cm

The ia»r »:• ^t». ^ b c ^ » Cffw Oace*. sJtaii !> j c t i r i a lo as r!te "Of^rf =_r»'fc«iyvis Caie'

7 y Z)

^/AA(L^\

M

EUJncLtL

buyers'Names} (PLEASE PRINT]

3e
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ACCEPTANCS«OUNTEROfFe«iREJECTION
HECK ONE:
a ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts ihe foregoing offer on the terms and coidttons specified
**• above.
i COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance Ihe terms of Buyer's clfer subjed to the exceptions or
J c o ^ _ _ „ ^ ^ j f i e , , ^ k # 0 ^ ADDENDUM NO.
rSJgraUjre)

*/XH*«<
(hata*) (Tknej

'

(Seiert SignaSre)

iters' Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

.

(Dale) (Xwnt)

( N o * * Address)

(Phone)

) REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.
iter's Signature)

(Date) ( T i m e ) ( S e H e r * s Signature)

t

<

M

<

(Date) (Time)

MIM»»»

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
ale law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (FU in applicable
ctJonbeJcw.)
ladatowtedgereceirtofafaal^
jp^ert Signature)

• ( D a l e )

Htefs Signature)

(gfa»)'

(Buyer's Signature)

(Setters Signature)

' J

(Date)

"

"(BSe)

I persooaly caused a Bnal copy of the fcxego^ Contra
] faxed [ Irnavfteri r ihand
ivtredon_
(Date), postage prepaid, tolhef ] Seller [ ] Buyer.
Sent/DeOvered by (specify) m

^rr^,,vt^t^l««CT30f1999
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SUPERSEDES ALL
ALL PREVIOUSI
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3 ^ ^ l n i l f a & v £ ^ _ Date V ? T O

Buv~-.

fc.«-T7^

^

^. /

Z

ADDENDUM J

RESIDENTIAL LEASE WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE
wot OflobsT.
«_ZCJ&-*M*m*m-X>

Ws^m^m^^^^{om.^
g _>—«•

T

L ; r W ^ - f o e r t m a r t e r catted Lessor and

consideration ol the sum 01

y P * M^r^s *)

? H OOP-*°

UJ-k._....

l<r\Q ^ f s

woeas&gns. r*reirarto a » r t Lessee. The Lessor, for and »

^oUars in naici paio h ••*? Les:c?. see** c? wmch * heiet'y aduwwledced. hereby leasestothe Lessee b*

-heirs or a s c i t e s . thepremises situated .nihiOtyof . - J & r ^ l t t
sutt0l

r-UMjf,

0«*.A t,_C3„regr,,7 A.

-

-

-

-..Cwi'Hyel

wga^^^ieae . l ^ : . . ^ . f f . > , M
!

L 2 J 2 _ s h - ^ s.. w ^ r J L ^ . ...fro */**<-*'-* ? -v-

<-•

O.i^hfrfrnfc.

rV«sl Ar^l...jdl^--'-ptiunJ

^u~sja „ < a r ^ _ ..o..-l Eu.leU<p

iitihelegtf descnpraaismft wdoO«l 3t the time c! weet-non. it may be JtecwU » wd incorporated he/em .^-fvferc. * (Slwet afldr-ss- - - ^
Me,0Vcx

U T

ft40S3

i aw consist tf J> * " « * * £ ^

U "

l n

fie>7^r-

I &

W

'

^ M _ ^ L

- ^ ^

n

' - -Sfef-tiSfSL, ! ^ ^ L

.

2. 7£RII:Thc!e.^r:eniof3rtfnco^meiK^an>_«_Auii/
3. RENT: Ren; shah* be S _

^

. f « * * t \ i ? 0 f t the wowing TEHMS and CONDITIONS

>. PERSONAL PROPERTY: SahJ lease stiai! -jidudt the h*owi:!fi person* ^ropifty: - - 2 * ^ . b ^ l l - i - J ? . r ^ i H -

f,r A C ^ /

4

^ *

J

**. . V . ^ h l

«-td«,rwnhibetofaperiodcM

lit?

r.-io!:m.;ibefeafter.

pe« month ps>at->e -n a>2s«;e. upiM 'J* .».«i wy o,' -JC* cale/iaa.' month to Lessor or his autiiorized agen' at the

Mto**a*ta»
i ' H S
W .
Z±CO__£,
k ^ e . . . W
e..._.LnL__&J£4&Q
.
or at such other places as may be designated by Lessenfcomtime iotimes,in me event rer.i ui I;OI a*d *?;!hm live (5/ days after at/* d«te. Lessee agrees to pay a iafe crarge of s — Q
plus interest at

^

% per a;num on tr* delmquen! jmoum.

4. UTILmESrLess^shaJiQerKpoiKibte^^

uc~uv

IiL^z

which siiaK be paid by Lessor.
5. USE: The premises 5ha£ be used as a res«o^ita and iu> no otrur pu.Vi-.3Si'. *»!hoi; ••* piv;i witicr cy- •>..;.. rr.- • -ss^
6. HOUSE RULES: in me even: that Ihe premises are i p&rhori d< a befldtfg containing more tha* «if»^ 'jmt. lessee ?5«es to athde by ^ry ar.d sN house rwtes. whether procnu»g?!esJ
before or alter the execution hereof, including, hut not hmitedlo. rules with f2spect lo noise, oeors, dispesai of nryji. peis. parking, ar-d use ol common i»eas.
7. ASSiGNWENT AND SUBLETTING: U S S M m*y ai»9fl <hU aorttmtRt er wow IR> porlkm of me premises w/T^w« prior wrtttpa conteot of the Lessor.
8. MAINTENANCE. REPAIRS OR ALTERATIOWS: Lessee sfcafl rrainiain the preo>ite-5 in a dean and SDrmnry numier inchidsng aM eqotpment. apphances, lumitun and tumisti
hgs tf*5tern and snail surrender the same sf lerminahon Hiiui. -.T JS cc»cd c^miiiior. ^? r^t:ved. .:c/iv;t! wsi.- .MVC f^cV -;>.• opfei. I essee s^»l t * ;espoTs»hie tcr oamaijes caused by ws,
negligence and lhatof ms famdy or mvftecs or guests. *>.IZM srw4;- ixc^^c .ntf maintain sir/ 5arrD;>noJru» a^w-Td;.. z\u»*<-3b iawns sx? shruobf ry. and keep thu same cter ol rubbish anfl
weeds i? such grounds are a part of the pfcmises and ire twciMUiy TG-' in* ,se t-? th4 Les^^c
9. ENTRY AND INSPECTION: Lessee shaH permit Lessor or Lessoi £ ayentt io enter the prw^cs at rsEsonab'* y n « 3RD .'por. reasonable no«ct :w ttu; purpose o? inspecting rhe
premises or for making necessary rt&irs
10. POSSESSION: » Lessor is uw»e to Oelivtr possesskm cA tte i*»rmsft; a. the commenccr»>r»r.| he..eol. i c?.*or ssar rrot &• liabletoraj»y da.T«ge causw »neret)y nor snatf ttxs
agfeement be vtvd or vofdab»e. out lessee shall nol be HaWa fw *v/ n-n» u.Ttl f;»vess«ort n ,le.Sv_T^u l*f^tt may ur/.r.na^ tnis agreement n poj»se56JO?> ns not setrvrad vfttnin
/-i=2
. days ol &e cummencememof frete.fti IfSieu?
11. SECUftfTY: fne security deposit ol S

s -.a! sec:-* Hf ?enufrr.ai:cf o.' r h l: i ^i»;*'s oo«g«tions iierecr»d»fr Lessor KUy. but sh>li nci be o r a t e d to.

LL.^

apply all or portions of sssd deposit cm account of lassee :s obh^ncn-i r*e^u«vier Ar»y oal»f.ce i?mvwng L-^I te»rn:najcii sh?M >..=: reuj^ed >o Lessee.
12. OEPOSTTFUNDS: Any r^tumabie 3eoosi!£ 3hal! be refunded wnr?>f, v,nttr. oay? iron uate possesi.«ori stfehve;BiI?5 lessor or nis A-jmorized Agent
13. ATTORNEY FEES: The orevaifing party sroil be crm>tc2 to all cosis incurred in connection with am'fcgalsct^on ^iHjg^l :>y either party to eaJcrce the lerms ncreof rr rrfaiing in
hie demised premies. induding i-easonaols altern* ^ t*«
14. NOTICES: Ai>y notice which either naiiy m*: w is .'L;J , JPI: »L V *»* *,'^y « ; .^-» •#, o:a;;.r.^ tr c ^ ;*t p.».«;»L' vi.--hi'.-. «•-. it^-v oi io uv.sor a» t»t aooresses 5f>o»ntoenwor *
sucri other c^2C5ias may se designaied t^r the paci.-t? *.ri.T r^.c ^ \«.v«.
15. HEIRS, ASSIGNS. SUCCESSORS: Trns :?w T r :»*j ^:..;r, >idi ?a:LL't - i ^ :.«:c . ..rj ^ : : f-: ??.:,r£. ri»e£:;fu.'i. -o.-n;nistraton. sjeccssors. a?A dssqnso'. ihr reipectrie
parses hereto
16. TIME: T»me is ol the essence of foil agreement. This of\u i.ha»: ,5'm*rrdtp if not3Ccefjieoco!GTi;_

l^l.l^z.

J

IS

7 , 0 0 ^

17. HOLDlNO OVER: Any holding ever afler cKj?:*-.n:r-t? cl !f* te/ n ->f th:s Iz*,*. wc^ tr.= :ci:^f -»•:? L*-.f:c: ihi»! yj jnu^.i.-ed 25 i: mcr.tn-ic*-mon;>. br-jtw; m acccrdanceivrth rhe
lerms hereol. as applicable.
1 e. DEFAULT; .1 Lessee sholl laH ta pay .'tfv: ^Y^^ OL. er jKflcrm *.;y i<;.Ti l;er««ol Mv :•* •.*.-. 'rH :»'• £r. *,; {?a, > • vr..'\sr. r.^Dce ui soon eefi»»rt ^wen »n ^ ma»»n*r required oy la*.
the Lessor, at n« option, may ierminateat! rightsc-L^-vtc- i^'tyr.uv-. ^>:i

ts^i-v *::»-4r. .>irf? «..TC. S-*r. m - K % dcMulr

i:

! zu*r. fABkbrts u/ v?.u?es ?hc property, whilemdetatrti

ot the payment of rtne. Lessor may consjoer any pjepw^y - n o:.« ?he premscs to bf a&ar^G,;-.^ and ,7 ay d^oib i.l toe w.r.f ,r in>r ^ ^
reasonably bafieves thai such abandonad prQperr>' uss («.o *Mt

J U ^ ^ J &y j * *torhe m* me Lessor

u may be crs^fued

|E)(HIBrT^1

OPTION: Lessee snaJi have the option to purchase ins leased premises descilbed herein upon thetafcntfngTERMS £rt CONDITIONS.
a.) The total purchase price shallte1 -

2LQ 5^ QSJL^Z

b.) The purchase price sfiatt be pari as toitews.

(

T^Ttf

^<"\&<& £i^JJ^£^i^.d

Dollars)

A H c * i r\

L ENCUMBRANCES:uessee9baJItaketitle to thepropertysubnetto" iJNeilf state1amr.xyri 2« i*••*>CCc-eiuits. cniulithii.v rest/idions.rasarvation-j.rijnts. rightso?wav
d taieminrs of record, If any. which do not materially arftocf the viiae or tniortce-J itsa o! me pro jerry
I. EXAMINATION OF TITLE: fifteen (IS) day*fromdale oifcxerirjeof t??rs .pti»!» ctt aiu^U - e icssss tc *i.miiireto«tiUr. Ut lb© f:0^ty and is te-purt in vntinp any valid
>jectiona thereto. Any e*ceyoons 10 the tine which would ot dttdosad by examination of the i«rrcas ffcj-lr* O I * T * C to have bean accepted :<nteij» leported »*• «vritino *Hfcin said 15
lys. U Lessee ooiects to any exceptions to the title. Lessor shall use all dje diii-jnnce to ?ei»M)ve sum a>c&0iicns a* l a o*n ttvpense wiitim 60 oiya litereaJiif But w such exception
moot be removed within the 60 days allowed, alt rqhu and oblation* lAieunaar may. at me dtoOtGA -•• tie i aisto. ur rnnalp ami end. untos* aa efcett to purtnase me property *ubfBd
) such exceptions.
a. EVIDENCE OF TITLE: lessor Shalt provide srtmon \A Tsto in thf ton* o! a cutir.v ut itt» insu?i«Kji ai Us,sui * t^enso
13. BILL OF SALE: Ths personal pro^^rty jdfcnt'fi*: in paugraph
24. CLOSING: Closing snail be within _ . __£=!

!

iha?J 5fc conveyed :•? Pt'f of '\k»

days Irom exa^se of n * option sKim i-varis* fwwrttj by ctho. teirr s o! th*s ao*eem**i!.

25» PRORATIONS: Tax and insurance escrow account, if &<v tj U if&isifjfed inUc! to Lessor with uo prorjbon*. UVtrtsi and other expense* ottoeprcpetty to te prorated as of the
date ot dosing. Unpaid reaJ estate taxes, security deposits, advance rentals or considerations ir. vowing futureteasecedfte sfcaJ! be ctedited to I essee
2ft* EXPIRATION O F OPTION: This option nay be exorcised at any t;rrjr priortott4 «(•:> JUCH at'nsdnichf
-*/'»•></
/
Upon eviration, Leseoi snail be released from alt oWroabon* bwttmttd.' -vd a4 ot L»*=t«. i fiii-.ii nar*unati. !&»*i or equitable. sha» r ftase

"t*"_„/£ ° j j ? _

27. EXERCISE OF OPTION: The option siuC Do exs/usar? cy n»a;ttr:o o» ijelutii-1{ wnttcn liotu* IO th« • issw pi:?r ;o the expirai;;* at tnis apt»o(s Ncrct it mailed shall be by
certified mail, postiye prepaid, to the Lessor at the address sstfoitn btftcw. H.X! stall be vHeif.-u;' •. •.• ;^vt> u»»i p**r, ipon t<,f duv ^.uwn on me postman of the envtkipe in vrhich IUC^
notice is mailed. In the event the option is exercised

*~ >>

percent Kom the rem pa«ii namu.idsr poor *i *t\$ exercise of the optwn shall be i/aditec upon the purchase pnot

28c fSQHT T O SELL: Lessor warrants to Lessee that lessor is the tea?* owner uf \M leased prc;?i»S(5 vati has Uw w^a! tight to sell leased premises under the tern\s and conditions of
this agreement.
IN WiTKCSS WHEREOT, the parties hereto hove erecutod this a^wrvn* the riay aird year fu ii abov& wit'en.

/^ P. eJcCiJ^
ItSSOK

ItSSOrt

^"ES5

'

"

'

~

AUDftSs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Debbie Reed, am employed by the office of ALLRED &
McCLELLAN, P. C ,

attorneys for Defendants herein, and hereby

certify that I served two copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS on counsel for Plaintiffs by placing true and correct
copies thereof in an envelope addressed to:
ALVIN R LUNDGREN
ALVIN R LUNDGREN L.C.
5105 W OLD HWY STE 200
MTN GREEN UT 84050
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Rooogvelt, Utah, on the Q/ /
day of November, 2006.

Debbie Reed

